Vaidik, J.
….
What this boils down to is what party should bear the responsibility of a State’s witness not showing up to two scheduled depositions at which the witness was subpoenaed both times. Martin says the State Department of Toxicology told him that Anderson was “unavailable” both times, and the State does not offer a contrary explanation on appeal. Moreover, the State does not allege that Martin did not provide Anderson with reasonable notice of the depositions, which is required by Trial Rule 30(B)(1) (“A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined . . . .”). We find that the balance tips in favor of Martin and therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in charging the delay to him. Thus, the 182 days from September 27, 2011, to March 26, 2012, count toward the Rule 4(C) period, bringing the total to 476 days. [Footnote omitted.] Because the days that count toward the Rule 4(C) period exceed 365, the trial court should have granted Martin’s motion for discharge. We therefore reverse the trial court and remand for vacation of his conviction.
Reversed and remanded.
BAILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.