Rucker, J.
. . . In Starks v. State, 523 N.E.2d 735 (Ind. 1988) this Court addressed for the first time the propriety of a trial court ordering sentences for two habitual offender counts to run consecutively. Initially we noted that although the habitual offender statute provides that a person may be sentenced as a habitual offender for “any felony,” the statute did not answer the question of “whether the legislature has sanctioned the pyramiding of habitual offender sentences.” Id. at 736. Analyzing the habitual offender statute—section 35-50-2-8—and the consecutive sentencing statute—section 35-50-1-2—we concluded that the imposition of consecutive habitual offender sentences was improper. In doing so the Court noted that although section 35-50-1-2 granted sentencing courts the discretion to order consecutive sentences, this discretion is limited by the rules of rationality and constitutional restrictions. Starks, 523 N.E.2d at 736. We observed that on the one hand a sentence enhanced by the habitual offender statute is based upon the existence of two prior unrelated felony convictions. On the other hand consecutive sentences are based upon the principle that each separate and distinct criminal act should receive a separately experienced punishment. Id. at 737. Further the Court observed that the statute was “silent on the question of whether courts have the authority to require habitual offender sentences to run consecutively, when engaged in the process of meting out several sentences.” Id. at 737. With the foregoing considerations in mind the Court held “[i]n the absence of express statutory authorization for such a tacking of habitual offender sentences, there is none.” Id.
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In this case the State contends that as a “general rule” a trial court may not impose consecutive habitual offender enhancements. Br. of Appellee at 4. But the State argues the general rule does not apply in this case citing authority standing for the proposition that a defendant “may not enter a plea agreement calling for an illegal sentence, benefit from that sentence, and then later complain that it was an illegal sentence.” Br. of Appellee at 4 (quoting Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40 (Ind. 2004)); see also Stites v. State, 829 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ind. 2005) (rejecting argument that plea agreement involving illegal consecutive sentence is invalid); Collins v. State, 509 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Ind. 1987) (rejecting argument that felony conviction underlying habitual offender adjudication was illegal where conviction was based on plea agreement). But these cases are distinguishable.
Here Crider’s plea agreement did not “call[] for an illegal sentence.” Crider pleaded guilty under terms of an agreement that provided for a three-year sentence in the Department of Correction for the offense of theft enhanced by three years for his adjudication as a habitual offender. The agreement was silent on whether the sentence imposed was to run concurrently or consecutively with the sentence imposed in another county. There was nothing unusual or illegal about this arrangement. The problem however is that as a result of an apparent misapprehension of the law, the trial court was under the impression that it was “require[d]” to order the habitual offender-enhanced sentence imposed in this case to run consecutively to the habitual offender-enhanced sentence imposed by the court in Tippecanoe County. Tr. at 28. This aspect of the sentence was not a part of the parties’ agreement. In consequence the trial court erred in imposing such sentence. We reiterate “[u]nder Indiana law, a trial court cannot order consecutive habitual offender sentences.” Breaston, 907 N.E.2d at 994.
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Taken together, our jurisprudence stands for the proposition that in Indiana, a defendant can waive his right to appeal an illegal sentence. [Footnote omitted.] Our cases have recognized legitimate reasons for this proposition. . . . In other words, our precedent supports the view that where a plea agreement provides for the illegality later challenged, a valid waiver contained therein will be upheld.
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Absent due process concerns to the contrary, when a defendant explicitly agrees to a particular sentence or a specific method of imposition of sentences, whether or not the sentence or method is authorized by the law, he cannot later appeal such sentence on the ground that it is illegal. See Lee, 816 N.E.2d at 40. In this case Crider made no such agreement. And in the absence of any such agreement, he was entitled to presume that the trial court would sentence him in accordance with the law. Crider’s waiver of appeal in his plea agreement therefore applied only to sentences imposed in accordance with the law. Because the law does not permit the imposition of consecutive habitual offender sentences and Crider did not agree to consecutive habitual offender sentences, his waiver of appeal is thus invalid and his habitual offender sentences must be ordered to run concurrently.
Dickson, C.J., and David, Massa and Rush, JJ., concur.