Najam, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Town of Cedar Lake (the “Town”) dissolved its Parks and Recreation Department (the “Parks Department”) and its Parks and Recreation Board (the “Park Board”). The Town appeals the trial court’s partial grant of summary judgment for Gina Alessia, Candi Reiling, and Andrew Balkema, individually and as members of the Park Board (the “Park Board Members”), on their complaint against the Town and others. The Town raises two issues for our review, which we restate as the following four issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it disregarded Indiana’s Home Rule Act in determining the validity of the Town’s action;
2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it ordered the Town to reinstate the Park Board Members to their official positions;
3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it enjoined the Town from “interfering in the workings” of the Park Board, Appellant’s App. at 48; and
4. Whether the undisputed evidence supports the trial court’s judgment that the law firm of Austgen Kuiper & Associates, P.C. (the “law firm”) may represent the Town but not the Park Board Members.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
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The traditional rule in the law of municipal corporations strictly circumscribed municipal power. This restriction was based on the principle that there is no inherent right to local self-government, that local governments possess no inherent powers, and, thus, that local governments must depend totally upon state legislatures for every power they exercise. Under this rule, Dillon’s Rule, a municipality could exercise only those powers specifically granted, necessarily implied, or indispensable to a municipal corporation. Before the Powers of Cities Act, this rule was firmly established in Indiana law. The Powers of Cities Act turned Dillon’s Rule upside down. The Power of Cities Act and, later, the Home Rule Act changed the legal landscape of the relationship between the State and its political subdivisions.
Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it used Dillon’s Rule to determine the scope of the Town’s legal authority to dissolve the Park Board and the Parks Department. The proper legal inquiry is based on Indiana’s Home Rule Act. Pursuant to that Act, there is no statutory prohibition against the Town’s exercise of authority to dissolve the Park Board or the Parks Department. And any doubt as to the existence of such power is resolved in favor of its existence. I.C. § 36-1-3-3. Accordingly, the Town’s exercise of that authority by enacting the Ordinance was lawful.
Given the Town’s authority under Indiana’s Home Rule Act, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the Park Board Members on their claims for illegal termination, declaratory judgment on the validity of the Ordinance, and injunctive relief. On each of those claims, we remand with instructions that the trial court enter summary judgment for the Town. We affirm the trial court’s order that the law firm may not continue to represent the Park Board and its members in any matters based on a current conflict of interest.
The trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the Park Board Members is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions for the court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Town on Counts I, II, and III of the First Amended Complaint.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.