Dickson, C.J.
Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation. Id.
The parties’ dispute stems from the proper legal standard for the trial court to apply when making its factual determination in step one of the two-step process. The defendant contends that the trial court erred by using the probable cause standard in evaluating whether the defendant actually committed the crime of Theft. . . . The defendant asserts that the trial court should have instead used the preponderance of the evidence standard. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(e) (2008) (“The state must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.”). The State argues, based on prior case law, that “[t]he proper standard for determining whether a probationer committed a crime is probable cause.” Appellee’s Trans. Br. at 4.
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The State relies primarily on this Court’s decision in Cooper v. State, 917 N.E.2d 667 (Ind. 2009). . . . In reviewing the denial of the motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion, the Court observed that “if the trial court after a hearing finds that the arrest was reasonable and there is probable cause to believe the defendant violated a criminal law, revocation will be sustained.” . . . .
Cooper appears to rely on a prior, superseded probation revocation statute which stated in part: “If it shall appear that the defendant has violated the terms of his probation or has been found guilty of having committed another offense, the court may revoke the probation or the suspension of sentence and may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.” Ind. Code § 35-7-2-2 (1971). The statute did not expressly provide a legal standard for courts to make this factual determination, but courts regularly used the probable cause standard in practice. . . . In 1976, Indiana Code Section 35-7-2-2 was amended to include a subsection (d), which stated, “The state has the burden of proving the violation [of a condition of probation] by a preponderance of the evidence.” P.L. 148-1976 § 23, 1976 Ind. Acts 718. The language in subsection (d) closely corresponds with the language in subsection (e) of the 2008 version of the statute. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(e) (2008) (“The state must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.”). Since the 1976 amendment, the statute has undergone repeal and reenactment, [footnote omitted] as well as numerous amendments. [Footnote omitted.] However, despite these changes, the language in subsection (e), calling for a probation violation to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, has remained largely unchanged since its 1976 revision. Based on this clear, explicit declaration of the legislature, the correct burden of proof for a trial court to apply in a probation revocation proceeding is the preponderance of the evidence standard. To the extent that Cooper may be read to permit proof only by probable cause, it is overruled.
Rucker, David, Massa, and Rush, JJ., concur.