Robb, C.J.
The parties appeared before the trial court on June 29, 2012, for a probation violation hearing. At the hearing, during a short conversation with the court, the State explained that Sparks had left the Hebron Center after only a few days of attendance. The court responded: “Right. So he left after three days. If he is willing to accept responsibility for his actions . . . I was thinking of giving him a four year sentence if he’ll do that. Otherwise, if you want to have a hearing, we can have a hearing.” Transcript at 5. The State informed the court that it would rather have a hearing, but after a recess, the attorneys informed the court that Sparks had decided to admit to the violation. Under oath, Sparks admitted that he left the Hebron Center on May 17. The court then reminded Sparks of the sentencing hearing at which the court had informed him that he had been given “the deal of a lifetime.” Id. at 7. When Sparks was given the opportunity to address the court, he indicated that he wanted to return to the Hebron Center and that he wanted to continue addressing his drinking problem. The trial court revoked Sparks’s probation and ordered him to serve the entirety of his five year suspended sentence. Sparks now appeals. [Footnote omitted.]
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An evidentiary hearing did not take place in this case. And while Sparks admitted to violating a term of his probation, this admission came following the trial court’s comment that it was inclined to give him four years if he accepted responsibility for his actions. The trial court’s comment at the outset of the hearing overlooks the fact that the probationer has a constitutional and statutory right to an evidentiary hearing in which the State proves the probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence before the trial court decides whether a condition of probation was violated. . . . .
Sparks argues that his admission was not made voluntarily and knowingly in light of the trial court’s comment. He contends that the trial court’s comment “actually misled” him to believe that he would receive a four year sentence, but the court later ordered him to serve his full five year term. . . . .
In this case . . . there was no finding by a factfinder regarding whether Sparks’s admission was voluntary and knowing. The record is not clear as to whether Sparks was “actually misled” regarding the consequences of his admission, though there appears to be some evidence that he did not understand the consequences of his admission. . . . .
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. . .[W]e do not decide the issue of whether a probation violation admission must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently in Indiana. Rather, we base our decision on the cumulative effect of the lack of an evidentiary hearing, the unknowing nature of Sparks’s admission, and the trial court’s comment. Thus, while an evidentiary hearing is not required if the defendant admits to the probation violation, the lack of an evidentiary hearing in this case in light of the trial court’s comment and the suspect quality of Sparks’s admission constitutes fundamental error. [Footnote omitted.] Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new probation revocation hearing consistent with the requirements of due process.
MAY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.