Crone, J.
Our review of the record before us shows that Carrillo did not testify as to whether he was married in 1997. He testified that he was currently married but separated and that he and his wife had four children together. Id. at 11. He did not testify as to the ages of those children.4 He did testify that he had a fifth child who at the time of the post-conviction hearing was twenty years old. Id. at 12. That child would have been around six years old in 1997. However, there is nothing in the record regarding whether Carrillo lived with or supported that child or had any relationship with that child’s mother at the time he pled guilty. All the record establishes is that in 1997 Carrillo had lived in the United States for thirty years, had not been to Ecuador in seven years, and had an eleven-year-old child. Carrillo’s family circumstances are not as compelling as the defendant’s in Sial, but are more compelling than those of the defendants in Trujillo and Clarke.
Taking into account the age at which Carrillo came to the United States, the length of time that he has lived here, and the fact that he had an eleven-year old child, it seems reasonable that the possibility of having to leave the United States would be a factor that a reasonable defendant would pause to consider when deciding whether or not to accept a guilty plea that would have negative immigration consequences. [Footnote omitted.] Whether a reasonable defendant in Carrillo’s place would have decided to reject the guilty plea and go to trial must now be evaluated in light of the strength of the case against Carrillo and the benefit that he received from pleading guilty.
The State had a very strong case that Carrillo committed possession of cocaine. The police saw him drop a clear plastic baggie that contained a substance that tested positive for cocaine. The officers’ testimony, the cocaine, and the laboratory report would have been overwhelming evidence of Carrillo’s guilt. Carrillo also benefited by pleading guilty. He received alternate misdemeanor sentencing and a fully suspended sentence thereby avoiding a first felony conviction and incarceration. The State also dismissed the misdemeanor public intoxication charge. Accordingly, we conclude that Carrillo has failed to show that there is an objectively reasonable probability that but for his counsel’s failure to advise him of possible adverse immigration consequences, he would have decided not to plead guilty. [Footnote omitted.] Therefore, we affirm the denial of Carrillo’s petition for post-conviction relief.
KIRSCH, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.