Brown, J.
In Ramirez [v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied], this court addressed whether certificates of inspection [of breath test equipment] are testimonial thus implicating the Confrontation Clause. . . . .
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Here, the Certification’s relevance is merely a creature of statute aimed at establishing the reliability of chemical breath test analysis results as a foundational requirement for submitting breath test results, which, we note, is a safeguard the legislature put in place for the benefit of the defendant. [Footnote omitted.] To that end, we note that the status of breath testing equipment cannot be termed a past event relevant to Jones’s prosecution. Put another way, if Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5 did not exist, the State would not have a need to submit the Certification and could simply introduce the results of the breath test, subject, of course, to the defendant’s Confrontation Clause protections. We also note that hearsay exceptions are not even relevant in this matter because Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(c) specifically provides that such certificates of inspection are admissible to establish that certain breath test equipment is in good operating condition.
Thus, based upon Williams and other recent statements from the U.S. Supreme Court, we reframe the third rationale articulated in Ramirez to provide that although certificates of inspection are kept on file by the court clerk and may be duplicated for use in court, their primary purpose is to ensure that certain breath test equipment is in good operating condition in compliance with Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5. However, we reaffirm our prior precedents and conclude that the Certification was nontestimonial and that the court did not err in admitting it.
Moreover, we agree with the State that any such error regarding the admission of the Certification and the attendant breath analysis was harmless. . . . .
BAILEY, J., concurs.
VAIDIK, J., concurs in result with separate opinion
I concur with the majority opinion in whole, including that the Certification asserting the accuracy of the breath-testing device is non-testimonial and therefore the trial court did not violate Jones’s confrontation rights by admitting it into evidence.
I wrote the opinion in Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), which was decided before Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). I agree with the majority that the Supreme Court’s later decision in Williams would not affirm the third rationale articulated in Ramirez. However, I disagree with the majority’s reframing of that third rationale in light of Williams. Instead of finding that the certificates of inspection are “prepared for purposes of criminal litigation, . . . [but] are not prepared in anticipation of litigation in any particular case or with respect to implicating any specific defendant,” id. at 218, the majority would find that the “primary purpose [of the certificates of inspection] is to ensure that certain breath test equipment is in good operating condition in compliance with Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5.” Slip op. p. 18. I respectfully disagree with this. I still believe that these certificates of inspection are generally “prepared for purposes of criminal litigation.” Therefore, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams, I would simply eliminate the third rationale articulated in Ramirez.