Baker, J.
In this case, we are presented with an issue of first impression, namely, what suffices as “reasonably particular” in a request for public records submitted under the Access to Public Records Act (APRA). [Footnote omitted.] Here, appellant-plaintiff, Seth Anderson, submitted four requests for emails pursuant to the APRA. Each request was identical – all seeking the emails sent or received within a four and one-half month time span – the only difference between the requests was that each named a different employee.
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II. Reasonably Particular
Anderson argues that his requests to the Commissioners were “reasonably particular” as required by Indiana Code section 5-14-3-3(a) and, therefore, his requests should not have been denied, and the Commissioners should have been court ordered to produce the records exactly as he requested them. [Footnote omitted.] The Commissioners counter that they did not refuse to provide access to public records. Instead, they asked for more information so that they could better facilitate Anderson’s request without incurring unreasonable cost and expense.
Initially, we observe that the public policy behind the APRA is to provide the public with full and complete information regarding the affairs of the government. See I.C. § 5-14-3-1 (stating that “it is the public policy of the state that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding affairs of the government . . . .”) However, to request access to a public record, it must be described with “reasonable particularity.” I.C. § 5-14-3-3(a)(1). The meaning of this phrase is the crux of the dispute between the Commissioners and Anderson.
When interpreting a statute, this Court will first give otherwise undefined words and phrases their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. Lovitt v. State, 915 N.E.2d 1040, 1044-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the statute. Id. at 1045.
“Reasonable particularity” is not defined within the APRA; however, Indiana Code section 5-14-3-1 states that “[t]his chapter shall be liberally construed to implement this policy and place the burden of proof for the nondisclosure of a public record on the public agency that would deny access to the record and not on the person seeking to inspect and copy the record.”
It is noteworthy that while the Commissioners agree with Anderson that the Public Access Counselor’s decision is not binding on the trial court or this Court, in the absence of case law or adequate statutory authority, this Court should give considerable deference to the opinions of the Public Access Counselor. The Commissioners point out that in other areas of administrative law, “with respect to an agency’s interpretation of statutes and regulations that [it] is charged with enforcing, such interpretation is entitled to great weight . . . .” Austin v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 947 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Nevertheless, the Commissioners concur with Anderson that unlike other cases under the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act, the trial court reviews an opinion of the Public Access Counselor de novo. I.C. § 5-14-3-9.
Here, Hoage, the Public Access Counselor, defined “[p]articularity” as “the quality or state of being particular as distinguished from universal.” Appellant’s App. p. 32. For example, a request for emails sent and received by a person in the last one hundred days lacks the particularity required to satisfy the statute and is a “universal” request. Id. at 31-33. Hoage also noted that records broadly involving a method of communication such as email did not rise to the level of “reasonable particularity” so as to compel disclosure. Id. at 33.
In reaching his conclusion, Hoage relied on prior opinions, inasmuch as this was not the first time that a Public Access Counselor had addressed this issue. Additionally, Hoage suggested ways in which Anderson could modify his request noting that “a request for all e-mail correspondence from Jane Doe to Jim Smith for a range of dates would be reasonably particular,” whereas “a request for all e-mail correspondence to and from Jane Doe for a range of dates is not reasonably particular.” Id. Instead, Anderson chose to file suit.
The trial court again referenced Hoage’s opinion, approving the examples of what would and would not be considered reasonably particular. Additionally, the trial court stated that allowing requests such as Anderson’s would permit a “fishing expedition.” Appellant’s App. p. 4.
Moreover, Anderson’s requests required that the Commissioners determine which emails were truly public records and which were not. Consequently, even after the Commissioners compiled the emails, they had to undergo a process to ensure that they did not provide protected health information or other non-disclosable material. Tr. p. 53. This process involved turning over the 9500 emails to Human Resources to be redacted, after an IT employee had already spent ten hours and purchased new software for acquiring the emails. Id. at 95, 98.
Nevertheless, Anderson points out that the “reasonably particular” requirement exists so that the government agency knows what is being requested from the agency. Anderson asserts that the strongest evidence that his requests were reasonably particular is that the Commissioners provided the information that Anderson requested without Anderson modifying his initial requests.
Although the Commissioners ultimately spent the time and expense compiling and reviewing 9500 emails, they did not necessarily have a legal obligation to do so, and, as argued above, the Public Access Counselor’s opinions state the opposite. To be sure, the fact that the Commissioners provided the information exactly as Anderson requested it does not define the APRA. Indeed, we agree with the Public Access Counselor’s opinion that Anderson’s requests were not reasonably particular under the APRA, and the Commissioners were under no legal obligation to provide to him the information as he requested. Consequently, this argument fails.
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The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
BARNES, J., and BROWN, J., concur.