Bradford, J.
“[U]nder a due process analysis, where the aggregate period of incarceration on resentencing is no greater than the original aggregate sentence, there is no presumption of vindictiveness.” People v. Woellhaf, 199 P.3d 27, 31 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) (citing U.S. v. Evans, 314 F.3d 329 at 333-34 (8th Cir. 2002); Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d at 13-14; State v. Larson, 783 P.2d. 1093, 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)). The core rationale for this rule, one that we accept, is the recognition that the sentences in a multi-conviction proceeding are interdependent:
When a defendant is convicted of more than one count of a multicount indictment, the district court is likely to fashion a sentencing package in which sentences on individual counts are interdependent. When, on appeal, one or more counts of a multicount conviction are reversed and one or more counts are affirmed, the result is an “unbundled” sentencing package. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1260 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853, 107 S.Ct. 187, 93 L.Ed.2d 121 (1986). Because the sentences are interdependent, the reversal of convictions underlying some, but not all, of the sentences renders the sentencing package ineffective in carrying out the district court’s sentencing intent as to any one of the sentences on the affirmed convictions.[2]
U.S. v. Shue, 825 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1987).
The Pimienta-Redondo court expanded upon this concept:
[W]hen a defendant is found guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a strong likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan. When the conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be free to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon remand, within applicable constitutional and statutory limits, if that appears necessary in order to ensure that the punishment still fits both crime and criminal.
Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d at 14.
We acknowledge that a trial court is likely to view individual sentences in a multi-count proceeding as part of an overall plan, a plan that can be overthrown if one or more of the convictions is reversed or reduced in degree. We join with those courts who allow the trial court flexibility upon remand, including the ability to increase sentences for individual convictions without giving rise to a presumption of vindictive sentencing, so long as the aggregate sentence is no longer than originally imposed.
NAJAM, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.