Kirsch, J.
In this case, the State filed a petition alleging J.R. to be delinquent because he had committed an act that would be Class D felony theft if committed by an adult. The State specifically alleged that J.R. broke into Overby’s home and stole the victim’s television iPod, and handgun. Appellant’s App. at 29. The State also filed a petition alleging J.R. to be delinquent because he committed an act that would be Class D felony auto theft if committed by an adult. That count specifically alleged that J.R. stole Overby’s 2007 Chevrolet Avalanche. These offenses, although occurring at the same time and at the same residence, are distinct because they each involved the violation of a different statute.
J.R. relies on Stout v. State, 479 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1985) for his contention that his true findings for theft and auto theft cannot stand. In that case, the defendant was charged with two counts of theft; in one count, he was charged with the theft of various items, including a television, a chain saw, and five guns, and in a second count, he was charged with the theft of an automobile from the attached garage. Id. at 568. Both counts alleged violation of Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2(a). Id. Our Supreme Court found that the defendant’s convictions for both counts of theft violated the single larceny rule because the defendant exerted unauthorized control over several items of personal property, including an automobile, all of which were taken at the same time from the same place, the victim’s home, and “[t]his constituted but one offenses in violation of a single statute.” Id. The Court stated that, in deciding an issue regarding the single larceny rule, the “the proper focus is on whether ‘the offenses to be prosecuted and punished are the same, and not whether the offenses spring from the same act or operative circumstances . . . . The ultimate focus is on the identity of the offenses, not on the identity of their source.’” Id. (quoting Elmore v. State, 269 Ind. 532, 539, 382 N.E.2d 893, 897 (1978), abrogated on other grounds by Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999)). The Court determined that the only distinguishing factor between the two counts of theft was the property stolen and reiterated that the State cannot split up a single theft offense and make distinct parts of that single offense the basis for separate or multiple prosecutions. Id.
We find Stout to be distinguishable from the present case. There, the only difference between the two theft counts was the identity of the stolen property; everything else was the same, including the violated statute. Both counts alleged a violation of Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2. Here, such similarity does not exist. In the present case, Count II alleged a theft and a violation of Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2. Appellant’s App. at 29. Count III alleged an auto theft and a violation of Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2.5. Id. At the time that Stout was decided, there was no distinct statute for the crime of auto theft. Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2.5 was enacted after the crimes in Stout occurred. The enactment of this separate statute indicated the General Assembly’s intention that auto theft be considered a completely separate offense from theft and that violations of the two statutes be considered distinct. Therefore, in Stout, the defendant was convicted of two counts of theft, which were identical offenses except for the identity of the property stolen. But here, true findings were made as to theft and auto theft, which are different offenses and violations of different statutes. We conclude that the crimes of theft and auto theft are distinct offenses, and J.R.’s true findings for both offenses did not violate the single larceny rule.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and MAY, J., concur.