Dickson, C.J.
After the defendant had fully served his sentence of imprisonment and probation for Child Solicitation, and during the ten-year period of his required registration as a sex offender, the statutory registration requirement was amended to require lifetime registration in certain circumstances. The defendant’s offense fell within these circumstances. Upon completion of his ten-year registration requirement, the defendant unsuccessfully sought his removal from the Sex Offender Registry, claiming refuge under the Indiana Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws. We hold that, under the facts of this case and as applied to this defendant, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution prohibits retroactive application of the lifetime registration requirement.
In 1997, the defendant, Andre Gonzalez, pled guilty to Child Solicitation, a class D felony. [Footnote omitted.] Ind. Code § 35-42-4-6. The trial court imposed a three-year sentence, with eighteen months incarcerated and eighteen months on probation. Upon discharge from probation in 1999, the defendant was required to register as a sex offender for ten years pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (“Act”). See Ind. Code § 5-2-12-5 (1996). In 2006, the legislature amended the Act to require certain sex offenders, based on the details of their crimes, to register with local law enforcement for life. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(c) (requiring lifetime registration if offender over age eighteen and victim under age twelve at time of crime). In 2010, after the defendant had completed ten years of registration, he wrote the trial court, requesting the removal of his registration requirement. On January 27, 2011, the defendant, by counsel, filed a “Verified Petition to Remove Sex Offender Designation Pursuant to Ind. Code 11-8-8-22.” Appellant’s App’x at 34. The trial court denied the petition, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. Gonzalez v. State, 966 N.E.2d 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The State sought transfer, urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with precedent. We granted transfer and thus consider the appeal and issues as originally presented to the Court of Appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
In his appeal the defendant contends that, as applied to him, the 2006 amendments to the Act, which belatedly extend his registration requirement from ten years to life, violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution. Ind. Const. art. 1, § 24. Important in the defendant’s claim is that there is no opportunity for review of the defendant’s future dangerousness or complete rehabilitation. The State asserts that the availability of a review process is irrelevant to the ex post facto determination.
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As noted above, this seventh Mendoza-Martinez factor requires that we consider whether the retroactive application appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. The alternative purpose is protection of the public from repeat sexual crime offenders. The degree to which a prior offender has been rehabilitated and does not present a risk to the public is thus integral to our evaluation of whether an extension of the ten-year registration requirement is reasonable in relation to such public protection. The availability of meaningful review of an offender’s future dangerousness is therefore germane to the determination of whether a statute’s effects are excessive. Under the procedures contained in Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-22, the sole avenue of relief available to a non-SVP defendant, a trial court may, if it chooses, summarily dismiss an offender’s petition without ever setting a hearing. [Footnote omitted.] Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22(e)(1). Further, Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-22 may be utilized only when there is an ameliorative change in federal or state law applicable to an offender’s prior conduct, Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22(b), (g), or when an offender files an ex post facto claim, Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22(j). Neither of these avenues of relief relates to an of-fender’s future dangerousness in relation to the alternative purpose assigned, protection of the public.
In the present case, the defendant, Gonzalez, as a non-SVP, may not predicate his request for relief on the grounds that he has been rehabilitated and presents no risk to the public. And the trial court has refused to grant a hearing despite his repeated attempts to seek the trial court’s review of his claim of ex post facto punishment. Thus, as to this defendant, we find that the retroactive imposition of a lifetime registration requirement appears excessive in relation to the purpose of protecting the public from repeat sexual crime offenders. For these reasons, we find this seventh factor weighs slightly in favor of treating the enhanced registration period as punitive rather than non-punitive.
David, Massa, Rush, JJ., concur.
Rucker, J. concurs in result.