Vaidik, J.
The State must only make sufficient allegations in the charging information that the alleged crimes fall within the statute of limitations; whether the State has actually met its burden of proving that the alleged crimes fall within the statute of limitations is a question for trial. Reeves v. State, 938 N.E.2d 10, 15-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
. . . Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) allows tolling of the statute of limitations to serve “the State’s interest of ensuring that it can later prosecute a criminal suspect even if, for a time, he conceals evidence of the offense such that authorities are unaware and unable to determine that a crime has been committed.” Id. at 17 (quoting Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quotation omitted)). As this Court explicitly held in Reeves, the State must “plead the circumstances of the concealment exception in the charging information,” id. at 17 (emphasis added), and that pleading must contain sufficient facts so that the “defendant is apprised of the facts upon which the State intends to rely on and may be prepared to meet that proof at trial.” [Footnote omitted.] Willner v. State, 602 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ind. 1992). Additionally, the charging information must also state “the date of the offense with sufficient particularity to show that the offense was committed within the period of limitations applicable to that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-34-1-2(a)(5).
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. . . If the probable-cause affidavit can be used to supplement the charging information in Patterson where the offense was not alleged with sufficient detail – charging information is insufficient under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2(a)(4) – we see no reason why the same cannot be true in a case where the concealment exception has not been alleged with sufficient detail to place the charged crimes within the applicable statute of limitations – charging information is insufficient under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2(a)(5). As long as the defendant is given enough information and notice to prepare an appropriate defense and does not have any of her substantial rights prejudiced, we see no reason why the probable-cause affidavit should not be considered in the analysis.
Since the charging information and probable-cause affidavit are filed together, they should be viewed in tandem to determine if they satisfy the goal of putting the defendant on notice of the crimes with which she is charged during the applicable statute of limitations period so that she can prepare an appropriate defense. We therefore disagree with the holding in Reeves that we must look only to the charging information in this case, as that would hinder the true intent behind charging informations, Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2, and Patterson.
MATHIAS, J., and BARNES, J., concur.