Crone, J.
Section 29-1-14-1(f) states:
Nothing in this section shall affect or prevent the enforcement of a claim for injury to person or damage to property arising out of negligence against the estate of a deceased tort feasor within the period of the statute of limitations provided for the tort action. A tort claim against the estate of the tort feasor may be opened or reopened and suit filed against the special representative of the estate within the period of the statute of limitations of the tort. Any recovery against the tort feasor’s estate shall not affect any interest in the assets of the estate unless the suit was filed within the time allowed for filing claims against the estate. The rules of pleading and procedure in such cases shall be the same as apply in ordinary civil actions.
While the statute lacks clarity with respect to harmonizing the various limitations periods for bringing claims, we find Justice Boehm’s explanation in Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Richie to be helpful:
[T]he most practical reading of [subsection (f)] is that a tort suit may be instituted at any time within the applicable tort limitation period …. By adding subsection (f), the legislature clearly intended to exempt tort actions for liability insurance proceeds from the requirements of the probate code. This seems to make eminent sense. The statute makes clear that the administration of the estate cannot be disturbed by a Johnny-come-lately tort suit because such a suit cannot reach the assets of the estate. If that is the case there seems to be no reason why a suit involving only insurance proceeds should not proceed as a normal tort suit uncomplicated by the Probate Code. Moreover, the second sentence of subsection (f) must be read in conjunction with the first. The first sentence clearly states that “nothing in this section shall affect or prevent the enforcement of a claim for injury….” Subsection (f) is among the things in “this section.” Accordingly we conclude that the only requirement that Indiana Code § 29-1-14-1(f) imposes on a tort action seeking liability insurance proceeds is that the suit be filed within the tort statute of limitations.
707 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1999).
Because Pistalo did not file a claim within the nine-month timeframe allowed for filing claims against Wilks’s estate, she could not disturb the distribution of estate assets, had there been any. Nevertheless, because she filed her tort action within the statute of limitations for a personal injury claim, she is entitled to recover from Progressive whatever sums Progressive owed to Wilks’s estate as Wilks’s insurer. In other words, Progressive not only was obligated to insure Wilks for the $100,000 policy limit, but it also owed Wilks pursuant to that insurance policy an obligation to exercise good faith in handling Pistalo’s claim against her.
Included in that good faith obligation was Progressive’s duty to avoid exposing Wilks’s estate to excess liability by refusing to settle for the policy limits. If Progressive failed to act in good faith, it risked liability to the estate for any excess judgment against it. Collins, 643 N.E.2d at 385. In that event, Progressive’s total obligation would include not only the policy coverage limit, but also the amount of any excess judgment. [Footnote omitted.] We are unaware of any compelling policy reason to condition the availability of the bad faith claim against Progressive upon the subsequent liquidity of Wilks’s estate. To do so would not serve the purpose of promoting good faith bargaining by liability carriers. In its proceedings supplemental order, Court I found that Pistalo owned a judgment of $309,000 (less $100,000 paid) and was entitled to prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees, but not from Progressive in that forum, because she had neither named Progressive as a party nor established a bad faith claim against Progressive. Thus, as a judgment creditor of the insured tortfeasor’s estate, Pistalo needed a procedural mechanism for pursuing an excess judgment directly from the insurer. She accomplished this by obtaining an assignment from Wilks’s estate. See id. at 386 (adopting judgment rule, which “mandates that if an insurer engages in bad faith while failing to settle a claim, the insurer must compensate the insured or its assignees, regardless of financial status.”) (emphasis added).
Pistalo contends that as an assignee, she obtained all rights that Wilks’s estate had against Progressive as Wilks’s insurer, including the right to the $333,600 excess judgment. . . . .
. . . .
In sum, tortfeasor Wilks purchased $100,000 in coverage from Progressive, and Progressive refused to settle with Wilks’s aggrieved party Pistalo for the $100,000 policy limit when given the opportunity to do so. Post-judgment, Progressive paid Pistalo $100,000, plus $1000 in attorney’s fees. By refusing to settle, Progressive placed its insured at risk of incurring a judgment for an amount exceeding the policy limits. As such, the $333,600 excess judgment Pistalo now seeks was part of Progressive’s bargained-for risk based on its duty to act in good faith with respect to its insured. In the proceedings supplemental, Court I found that Pistalo had neither made a claim of bad faith against Progressive nor named Progressive as a party. However, once Pistalo obtained the assignment [of all the estate’s rights against the insurer Progressive] from Wilks’s estate, she was in a position to file a direct action against Progressive for the entire amount of its obligation to the estate based on its alleged bad faith refusal to settle for the policy limits. [Footnote omitted.] If bad faith is established, Progressive’s obligation to Pistalo will include not only the stated policy limits, but also the amount of the excess judgment. Because the issue of whether Progressive acted in bad faith has not been established in the designated materials as a matter of law, we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision. [Footnote omitted.]
RILEY, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.