May, J.
The State charged Austin with two counts of Class A felony dealing in cocaine. On June 6, 2011, Austin asked for a speedy trial, so the seventy-day period during which the State was obliged to bring him to trial ended August 15, 2011. His case was set for trial August 8, but on July 27 the State moved to continue the trial due to court congestion. The trial court granted the motion and rescheduled Austin’s trial to September 26. On August 17, Austin filed a motion for discharge, which the trial court denied.
The court congestion on which the trial court premised its continuance from August 8 to September 26 was a trial for an incarcerated criminal defendant, Harmon, whose case was older than Austin’s. The Harmon trial began August 8, a Monday, and lasted three days. Austin argues he could have been tried on August 15, the last day in the seventy-day period.
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Nor would the continuance of a civil trial have accommodated Austin’s trial on the 15th. At a hearing on his motion for discharge, Austin told the trial court “[o]n August 15th Mr. Austin could have been tried in this courtroom. That is the basis for the motion for discharge.” (Tr. at 235.) The trial court responded that there was a contested child custody and support hearing scheduled that day and it took place that day. No jury had been called to hear a jury trial the week of the August 15, and the court was not prepared to hear a jury trial. The State noted it could not subpoena witnesses, some of whom were out-of-state, on such short notice. The trial court did not err in denying Austin’s motion for discharge.
NAJAM, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.