Bradford, J..
[T]he State argues that the crime of failure to report is a continuing offense, and therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the LaPorte County Prosecutor’s Office received the ISP’s investigation report on October 23, 2010. The doctrine of continuing offenses holds, “Where there is a continuing duty to do some act, the statute of limitations does not apply where some portion of the offense is within the period of limitations.” DeHart v. State, 471 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). In other words, “The offense continues as long as the duty persists[] and there is a failure to perform that duty.” Wright v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 4th 521, 525 (1997). An offense should not be deemed continuing “unless the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that [the legislature] must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).
We conclude that Indiana’s failure to report child abuse or neglect statute contemplates the crime as a continuing offense. Although the statute does not utilize the terms “continuing” or “continuous,” it includes the following provision to that effect: “This chapter does not relieve an individual of the obligation to report on the individual’s own behalf, unless a report has already been made to the best of the individual’s belief.” Ind. Code § 31-33-5-3. An individual who has not been “relieved” of his duty to report must be considered to have a continuing duty to do so. To conclude otherwise effectively limits the duty to report to the day on which a “reason to believe” arises. Such a conclusion would frustrate the statute’s asserted purpose to “provide protection for an abused or a neglected child from further abuse or neglect.” Ind. Code § 31-33-1-1 (emphasis added). To permit an individual with a duty to report to avoid prosecution for failure to report because that individual’s failure was not discovered within 730 days does nothing to protect a child who may still be the victim of abuse on day 731 or beyond.
Lebo contends that, because that statute requires a person with a duty to report to “immediately make an oral report….” Ind. Code § 31-33-5-4 (emphasis added), the offense cannot be considered continuing. But although “the violation is complete at the first instance the elements are met[, i]t is nevertheless not completed as long as the obligation remains unfulfilled. ‘The crime achieves no finality until such time.’” Wright, 15 Cal. 4th at 526 (quoting Cores, 356 U.S 405, 409 (1958)). Lebo’s contention merely recognizes one part of this duality.
ROBB, C.J., concurs.
BAKER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion:
I agree with the majority’s determination that the statute of limitations had not run with respect to the State’s ability to bring charges against Lebo. More particularly, I believe that Lebo’s concealment, properly alleged in the charging informations, tolled the statute of limitations as it applied to her such that the charges filed against her in September 2011 were not time-barred.
Because by all accounts the statute of limitations had not run, I believe that it is unnecessary for this Court to reach whether our legislature contemplated or created the offense of failure to report child abuse or neglect as a continuing offense. Nevertheless, because the majority reaches this issue, I must note that I cannot agree with the majority’s characterization of the failure to report child abuse or neglect as a continuing offense that never invokes the statute of limitations.