Massa, J.
When a husband shoves his wife and pokes her in the forehead repeatedly, causing her pain, is that pain alone sufficient evidence to prove the “bodily injury” element of the husband’s conviction for domestic battery? One panel of the Indiana Court of Appeals thought not, but we disagree.
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From this one can see that, despite our prior cases all seeming to have higher levels of injury to the victims, we have never said a particular level of pain is required in order to rise to the level of impairment of physical condition and thus satisfy the definition of bodily injury. Rather, we think the proper reading of Indiana’s statute, and those cases, is that physical pain is an impairment of physical condition. [Footnote omitted.]
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Our holding today settles a question of statutory interpretation about which reasonable minds can differ. We choose this approach, in part, because we believe the alternative—requiring physical pain to rise to a particular level of severity before it constitutes an impairment of physical condition—could bring uncertainty to our relatively straightforward statutory structure. [Footnote omitted.] Indeed, the holding below does not define the level of pain needed to support the enhancement; instead, it surveys other Indiana cases where the pain was more obviously severe and finds Farrenquai’s lacking in comparison. Bailey, slip op. at 8–9. We think engaging in a case-by-case comparison to determine whether a victim’s pain is sufficiently significant creates unnecessary challenges not required by the statute.
First, it could unfairly discount the suffering of certain victims who may have a lower pain tolerance than others, which runs counter to the long-standing rule of both criminal and tort law that a defendant takes his victim as he finds him. See Defries v. State, 264 Ind. 233, 244–45, 342 N.E.2d 622, 630 (1976) (“On the other hand, if one throws a piece of chalk at the legendary victim with an eggshell skull, and the chalk strikes the victim and fractures his skull, the perpetrator would be guilty under our statute even though he did not intend to do great bodily harm.”); cf. Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 284 (Ind. 2000) (defendant liable for “aggravation or exacerbation of a current injury”). Though they may have a greater sensitivity to pain, these individuals are no less victims than someone who may be more tolerant.
Second, it excuses from punishment conduct that is covered under the language of the statute. Though we construe criminal statutes strictly against the State, “a statute should not be overly narrowed so as to exclude cases fairly covered by it and should be interpreted so as to give efficient operation to the expressed intent of the legislature.” State v. Bigbee, 260 Ind. 90, 93, 292 N.E.2d 609, 611 (1973). Following the Bailey panel’s approach could create a gap in which some batterers inflict pain—up to an undefined degree—and face only a B misdemeanor. We do not believe this was what the General Assembly intended.
Nor does our approach read “impairment of physical condition” out of the statutory definition or render it superfluous. See Bailey, slip op. at 6. Instead, if one reasonably considers an “ideal” physical condition as that of an uninjured, healthy, pain-free, and unencumbered person, then physical pain would necessarily impair that physical condition—maybe in only a small way, but the statute expressly says “any impairment of physical condition.” Ind. Code § 35-41-1-4 (emphasis added). It does not require that the impairment be significant or severe.
We do acknowledge that our approach—that a defendant commits a battery at his peril; that any degree of physical pain may constitute a bodily injury and thus enhance punishment—may raise the specter of witness coaching, whereby a victim is encouraged to say “it hurt” when, in actuality, it did not. Or that a victim may simply claim pain to enhance a charge against a defendant—a particular danger in the arena of domestic violence, where there often can only be two witnesses (the accused and the accuser), the disputes are emotionally charged and deeply personal, and trials can thus literally boil down to a heated “he said/she said.” But those are challenges of witness credibility, not statutory construction, and they are not new to criminal litigation. They are largely addressed through zealous advocacy and effective cross-examination.
Here, Farrenquai testified that she was shoved and repeatedly poked in the forehead and that each of these acts caused her pain. Her testimony was not uncontroverted. For one thing, Elmer denied putting his hands on Farrenquai in any way, creating a clear conflict between two witnesses. Furthermore, Farrenquai also testified that she asked the responding officers (after the pushing and poking) if someone was going to have to get hurt before they arrested Elmer, creating a potential inference that she had not been hurt before that point. Finally, Farrenquai testified that both she and Elmer had been drinking that night, which might lead to the inference that neither witness had a full and clear memory of the events.
Weighing it all, Judge Rogers chose to believe Farrenquai’s testimony that Elmer both battered her and the battery caused her physical pain. As we said above, under review for sufficiency of the evidence we will not reweigh evidence—even if conflicting—and we will leave undisturbed a trier of fact’s assessment of witness credibility. Here, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to his conviction, there is substantial and sufficient evidence of probative value that Elmer shoved Farrenquai and poked her in the forehead several times, causing her pain.
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Dickson, C.J., Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.