SHEPARD, Senior Judge
At the close of the June 7, 2010, suppression hearing, the court invited West to request a continuance to allow time for post-hearing submissions and the court’s ruling. West did so, and the court vacated the June 14 trial date.
Both parties submitted proposed findings and conclusions on August 16, 2010. The court allowed each side fifteen days to respond to the opposing party’s submission and set the cause for a final pre-trial conference on October 1, 2010. On August 27, 2010, West amended his proposed findings and responded to those of the State.
The case then sat for a year with virtually no activity. There are no entries in the chronological case summary in the year following West’s August 27, 2010, submissions, though the record shows that the court called defense counsel’s office on October 1, 2010, for the final pre-trial conference, but counsel missed it because he was waiting at home for the phone call. The conference was not rescheduled.
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West filed his suppression motion a full two months before the jury trial date. The court quickly set it for a hearing. The hearing was then rescheduled multiple times, and the jury trial was reset once before it was ultimately vacated.
Although West’s motion technically delayed the March 2010 trial inasmuch as the date was reset and later vacated, we cannot conclude that West was solely responsible for the delay. By August 27, 2010, the suppression hearing had been held and the parties’ final proposed findings and conclusions and West’s response to the State’s submission were all before the court. A whole year passed before West praeciped for a new judge on August 29, 2011. We cannot attribute these twelve months to West.
The State contends that West caused the delay by asking the court for an indefinite continuance of the June 14, 2010, trial date during the June 7, 2010, suppression hearing. “When a defendant requests an indefinite continuance and later becomes dissatisfied that his trial has not been reset, he must take some affirmative action to notify the court that he now desires to go to trial to reinstate the running of the time period.” Wheeler v. State, 662 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Here, too, the analysis must proceed on a case-by-case basis. See id.
Although West moved for a continuance, we note that the court prompted him to do so. The transcript of the hearing reflects that the parties and the court expected that a trial would not be set until the court ruled on the suppression motion. See Tr. p. 4 (court noting that it would rule and then determine whether to reset the cause for trial). The court had all of the parties’ arguments before it by August 27, 2010. Based on these facts, it was reasonable for West to expect that the court would rule on his motion and that he would, if necessary, be timely tried.
The State cites cases in which defendants who specifically asked for indefinite postponements were denied relief under Rule 4. The defendants in those cases asked for continuances so that they could seek other relief.1 It was thus incumbent on them to inform the courts when they wanted to proceed to trial. In contrast, the parties here were simply waiting for the court’s suppression ruling, which would determine whether the trial was reset.
On these facts, we cannot conclude that West requested an indefinite continuance such that he needed to notify the court that he wished to proceed to trial.
The State had an affirmative duty to bring West to trial within one year as provided by Rule 4(C). See Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind. 2004). It did not do so. Although we recognize that the court failed to timely rule on the suppression motion, the State could have filed a praecipe under Trial Rule 53.1 for withdrawal of submission and transfer to the Supreme Court for appointment of a special judge. West was not obliged to ask for a trial date.
Because more than one year had passed for purposes of Rule 4(C), the trial court erred by denying West’s motion for discharge. We therefore reverse.
BAILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.