FRIEDLANDER, J.
Ind. Code Ann. § 31-32-5-1 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective May 31, 2012) codifies the protections afforded to juveniles with respect to the waiver of constitutional rights. For unemancipated minors such as R.W., it provides that the rights can be waived by a parent if “(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right; (B) that person has no interest adverse to the child; (C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child; and (D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver[.]” I.C. § 31-32-5-1(2). The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile received all of the protections of this provision “and that both the juvenile and his or her parent knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the juvenile’s rights[.]” D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Ind. 2011).
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In the context of juvenile delinquency proceedings, our Supreme Court has stated that “[w]ritten waiver forms are not required to satisfy the constitutional demands of Miranda or the statutory requirements of [I.C. §] 31–32–5–1, but they are particularly strong evidence.” D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d at 343. Moreover, when used, “they should be clear and unequivocal.” Id. In the present case, only Mother signed the top half of the waiver form pertaining to the acknowledgment of the advisement of R.W.’s rights, but only R.W. signed the bottom half, which is the portion of the waiver form that conveys the actual waiver of the rights. Based upon the way the form was completed, one may speculate as to how it came to pass that only one signed the top half and only the other signed the bottom half. Such speculation, however, cannot cure the fatal flaw in the document, i.e., that R.W.’s mother’s signature does not appear on the line denominated “PARENT’S SIGNATURE”, signifying that Mother acceded to the waiver of R.W.’s constitutional rights. Thus, we must look elsewhere to find evidence that Mother consented to the waiver. Mother did not testify at the denial hearing. Detective Brice Adams, the IMPD officer who advised Mother and R.W. of his rights and presented them with the waiver form, and who conducted R.W.’s questioning, offered no testimony on the subject of Mother’s consent to waiver. The videotape itself is similarly unhelpful. In short, we find no evidence indicating that Mother consented to the waiver of R.W.’s rights. Absent a valid waiver of rights, it was error to admit R.W.’s confession.
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In the present case, the juvenile court entered a “not true” finding with respect to the criminal mischief allegation under Count 2, but not upon the basis that it found the evidence supporting that allegation to be lacking in some regard. In fact, we think it mischaracterizes the juvenile court’s finding on this count to focus simply upon the court’s use of the phrase “not true” when ruling on that count. The court explicitly found the allegation of criminal mischief to be true in that the evidence established all of the elements thereof, but it explicitly “merged” that count with the burglary allegation and entered a true finding only upon the latter. Therefore, preferring substance over form, we interpret the juvenile court’s comments and order as reflecting that the allegation of delinquency contained in Count 2 was established, but merged. We have vacated the true finding with respect to burglary upon our conclusion that the only element differentiating the two, i.e., the intent to commit a felony, was not supported by sufficient admissible evidence. As indicated, there was sufficient evidence to establish the remaining elements of burglary, which also constitute every element of the offense of criminal mischief. See Freshwater v. State, 853 N.E.2d 941. Therefore, consistent with the rationale espoused in Carter and Taflinger, as discussed above, we remand with instructions to reinstate the true finding on Count 2.
In summary, we conclude that the juvenile court committed fundamental error in admitting R.W.’s videotaped confession, which constituted the only evidence of the element of intent to commit a felony with respect to the allegation of burglary under Count 1. Therefore, the true finding under Count 1 must be reversed. We affirm the juvenile court’s finding that the State’s evidence established the allegation in Count 2 that R.W. committed acts that would constitute the offense of criminal mischief. Further, because we reversed the true finding on Count 1, with which the finding in Count 2 was “merged”, we remand with instructions to enter a true finding with respect to the merged Count 2.
MAY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.