SULLIVAN, J.
Robert Smith was placed on home detention under the supervision of a community-corrections program in January, 2010. He argues that the introduction of certain hearsay evidence at the hearing revoking his community-corrections placement violated his due process right to confrontation. Because we conclude that the hearsay evidence introduced at the hearing was substantially trustworthy, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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We reject the argument that Smith’s due process right to confrontation should be the same right to confrontation as defined in Crawford for purposes of the Sixth Amendment; moreover, we reject any argument that Crawford changed the due process analysis we employ in revocation proceedings. Cf. State v. Rose, 171 P.3d 253, 258 (Idaho 2007) (rejecting argument that Crawford applies with equal force to a probationer’s due process right to confrontation); State v. Marquis, 257 P.3d 775, 778-79 (Kan. 2011) (rejecting argument that Crawford changed due process analysis applicable to probation-revocation proceedings).
In Reyes, we adopted the “substantial trustworthiness” test for determining when hearsay evidence should be admitted at probation-revocation hearings. 868 N.E.2d at 441 (following Kelley, 446 F.3d at 692). . . . .
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As mentioned above, State’s Exhibit 1 consists of five lab reports showing that Smith had tested positive for cocaine and marijuana on five separate occasions and an affidavit from Megan R. Jones, who was the supervisor at the lab that performed Smith’s drug tests. In her affidavit, Jones attested to a number of things:
She is the Lab Supervisor of Global Drug Testing Labs (“Lab”), and in that capacity, she is familiar with the procedures utilized by the employees to ensure the integrity of the chain of custody of the specimens submitted to the Lab and in the testing of the speci-mens.
The procedures employed by the Lab, including the urine specimen’s submission; the storage and transportation of the specimen; the chain of custody and labeling; and the testing and retesting of specimens.
She reviewed the records kept in the Lab with regard to the urine specimens submitted by Robert Smith on February 2, 2010; March 3, 2010; April 9, 2010; April 19, 2010; and April 26, 2010, and all the procedural steps were followed in analyzing this specimen ac-cording to the documentation kept in the normal course of business of the Lab.
The various analyses of the specimen provided by Smith tested positive for cocaine and THC (marijuana).
State’s Ex. 1, at 3-5. The affidavit was made under oath, was signed by Jones, and was notarized.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence adequately supports the trial courts findings that State’s Exhibit 1 is substantially trustworthy. Cf. Reyes, 868 N.E.2d at 442 (affidavits found to be substantially reliable when the affiant was director of lab, was familiar with procedures employed to ensure chain of custody and validity of testing, and had reviewed records with regard to drug test at issue). Thus, Smith’s due process right to confrontation was not violated by the admission of this exhibit.
Dickson, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.