BAILEY, J.
The Boone Circuit Court determined that Jeremiah Cline (“Cline”) is not required to register as a sex offender, but also determined that it lacked authority to order the removal of Cline’s name and information from the Indiana Sex Offender Registry (“the Registry”). Cline appeals and presents the sole issue of whether the trial court has authority to expunge Cline’s information from the Registry. We affirm.
. . . .
Subsequent to the Wallace decision, our Legislature amended the Act such that it includes a provision allowing a sex offender to petition for removal of the designation, providing in relevant part:
(c) A person to whom this section applies may petition a court to:
(1) remove the person’s designation as an offender; or
(2) require the person to register under less restrictive conditions.
(d) A petition under this section shall be filed in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the offender resides
. . . .
(g) A court may grant a petition under this section if, following a hearing, the court makes the following findings:
(1) The law requiring the petitioner to register as an offender has changed since the date on which the petitioner was initially required to register.
(2) If the petitioner who was required to register as an offender before the change in law engaged in the same conduct after the change in law occurred, the petitioner would:
(A) not be required to register as an offender; or
(B) be required to register as an offender, but under less restrictive conditions.
(3) If the petitioner seeks relief under this section because a change in law makes a previously unavailable defense available to the petitioner, that the petitioner has proved the defense.
Ind. Code § 11-8-8-22(c)-(d),(g). Cline contends that the foregoing is a statutory codification of Wallace, and must be interpreted so as to not only relieve him of future obligations but also to provide for removal of his name and existing information from the Registry. According to Cline, complete expungement is required to avoid ex post facto punishment because retention of identifying information (even without a duty to provide updates) has a punitive effect upon him akin to the ex post facto punishment discussed in Wallace. He thus argues that, not only should he not have to register in the future, he should be placed in a position as if he had never reported his personal information.
In Wallace, our supreme court recognized that the Act imposes “significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom it applies” and “exposes registrants to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism.” 905 N.E.2d at 379-80. . . . Effectively, our supreme court invited the Legislature to provide a “mechanism by which a registered sex offender can petition the court for relief from the obligation of continued registration and disclosure” or for shortening the time of obligation. Id. (emphasis added.) The Legislature responded by enacting a mechanism for relief from registration obligations and for shortening of the period of obligation. Notably, the Wallace Court did not address expungement; nor did the legislative response specifically do so.
Although Cline claims he will have to endure the stigma associated with registration even if he does not register in the future, the fact that Cline committed sex crimes is a matter of public record. We do not read the Wallace decision as broadly as does Cline; it does not insulate an offender from all punitive consequences associated with having committed his crimes. [Footnote omitted.] Furthermore, the statutory provision under which Cline sought relief does not include an expungement provision. [Footnote omitted.] We will not add such a provision. See Cox, 866 N.E.2d at 809 (observing that we will not read into a statute that which is not the manifest intent of the legislature).
Nonetheless, a panel of this Court has very recently observed: “The undisputed facts here establish that the DOC [the Indiana Department of Correction] determines whether an incarcerated individual belongs on the Registry and also handles complaints about mistaken sex offender registrations.” Myers v. Coats, 966 N.E.2d 652, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added). We further observed that the DOC had added an administrative appeal to allow for challenges to errors on the Registry. Id. at 4, n.4. Cline is not precluded from this avenue, although we express no opinion on the breadth of relief to be afforded, if any.
MATHIAS, J., concurs.
ROBB, C.J., dissents with opinion:
Subsection (c)[of I.C. 11-8-8-22] states that the relief Cline seeks is available so long as the section applies to Cline. Subsection (b) states that a court may grant a petition to remove one’s designation as an offender, referring to subsection (g), if “a change in federal or state law” after a certain date resulted in particular consequences for others. Subsection (g) also describes a court’s authority regarding the registry when particular changes in the law occur.
The only way the repeated references to a “change in law” in section 11-8-8-22 make sense is if the section addresses the supreme court’s concern that some applications of the registry laws lead to violations of the Indiana Constitution’s ex post facto clause. If the statute – particularly subsection (c) – does not mean that a court may remove an offender’s name and information from the registry, then it has no meaning at all. . . . .