Vaidik, J.
Case Summary
Denise (Mertz) Grimmer (“Mother”) and Robert Mertz (“Father”), who have two children, were divorced in 1994. Over the course of these proceedings, Father’s child support obligation has been modified many times, and due to arrearages, Father’s driving privileges were suspended. The most recent court order modified his weekly child-support obligation to what amounts to half of his income: $49 for support, $62 for educational expenses, and the remainder toward his arrearage. In addition, because Father agreed to pay one-half of his income toward these amounts, his driving privileges were reinstated. On appeal, Mother contends that the trial court erred in modifying his child-support obligation and in reinstating Father’s driving privileges. We conclude that the trial court did not err in modifying Father’s child-support obligation. We also conclude that Father’s plan to pay one-half of his income toward his support obligation was a sufficient plan to warrant reinstatement of his driving privileges. We affirm.
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II. Reinstatement of Father’s Driving Privileges
Mother also contends that the trial court erred in reinstating Father’s driving privileges. Indiana Code section 31-16-12-7 provides in relevant part:
If a court finds that a person is delinquent . . . as a result of an intentional violation of an order for support, the court shall issue an order to the bureau of motor vehicles:
(1) stating that the person is delinquent; and
(2) ordering the following:
(A) If the person who is the subject of the order holds a driving license or permit on the date of issuance of the order, that the driving privileges of the person be suspended until further order of the court.
A person is considered delinquent if he or she is at least $2000 or three months past due on payment of court-ordered child support. Ind. Code § 31-25-4-2. There appears to be no dispute that in November 2008, the trial court had properly issued an order to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles to suspend Father’s driving privileges pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-16-12-7.
Father subsequently requested that his driving privileges be reinstated pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-16-12-11, which provides:
Notwithstanding section 7 . . . of this chapter, the court may stay the issuance of an order under section 7 . . . if:
(1) the person pays the child support arrearage in full; or
(2) an income withholding order under IC 31-16-15 . . . is implemented and a payment plan to pay the arrearage is established.
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We conclude that the language of Section 31-16-12-11 is clear and unambiguous. It requires that an obligor establish “a payment plan to pay the arrearage.” It does not impose any constraints upon that plan. We therefore conclude that the sufficiency of a plan offered by an obligor is best determined by a trial court, which is well-versed in the specific facts of a case. Here, the court concluded that Father’s plan to pay one-half his income toward his obligation was sufficient, and we agree.
NAJAM, J., concurs.
ROBB, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
ROBB, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority that the trial court did not err in modifying Father’s child support obligation as discussed in Part I, but respectfully dissent from its conclusion in Part II that the trial court did not err in reinstating Father’s driving privileges.
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Although the statute gives the trial court discretion in reinstating an obligor’s driving privileges, see Ind. Code §31-16-12-11 (“the court may stay the issuance of [a suspension] order”) (emphasis added), I do not believe the statute gives the trial court the discretion to reinstate Father’s driving privileges under the circumstances of this case….
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The statute requires “a payment plan to pay the arrearage” be established in order for the trial court to reinstate Father’s driving privileges. As Father’s plan will neither pay his arrearage nor does it require him to pay the maximum amount allowed by law, I would hold the trial court clearly erred in reinstating Father’s driving privileges. Accordingly, I dissent from Part II of the majority decision.