GARRARD, S.J.
In March 2010, the State filed a delinquency petition against Estrada for three counts of Class C felony robbery if committed by an adult. The petition covered the last three robberies, where no weapons were seen: the Speedway robbery on May 2, 2009, the Huck’s robbery on May 8, 2009, and the 7-Eleven robbery on May 9, 2009. Estrada admitted to the allegations and was adjudicated a delinquent.
In May 2010, the State charged Estrada with two counts of Class B felony armed robbery as an accomplice based on the first two robberies. Ind. Code §§ 35-42-5-1 (1984), 35-41-2-4 (1977). The State also charged her with one count of Class C felony conspiracy. Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2 (1977). Estrada filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that her adult criminal prosecution was barred by her juvenile adjudications on the three other robberies. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
. . . .
Estrada contends that the trial court should have granted her motion to dismiss because the charges were barred by Indiana Code section 35-41-4-4 (1977), the successive prosecution statute, which provides in relevant part:
(a) A prosecution is barred if all of the following exist:
(1) There was a former prosecution of the defendant for a different offense or for the same offense based on different facts.
(2) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction of the defendant or in an improper termination under section 3 of this chapter.
(3) The instant prosecution is for an offense with which the defendant should have been charged in the former prosecution.
Specifically, Estrada argues that she was subjected to a juvenile proceeding for the last three robberies, that the proceeding resulted in juvenile adjudications for what would be Class C felony robbery if committed by an adult, and that the criminal charges here are for offenses that should have been charged in the juvenile proceeding. The State responds that the successive prosecution statute does not apply because juvenile proceedings are civil matters and do not result in criminal convictions.
We need not decide whether Indiana Code section 35-41-4-4 applies to juvenile proceedings to resolve the issue before us. Assuming without deciding that it does, subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) appear to be satisfied. However, Estrada must show that subsection (a)(3) has been met, that is, that the two counts of Class B felony armed robbery and one count of Class C felony conspiracy “should have been charged” in the juvenile delinquency petition.
This brings us to a question of subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction concerns whether a court has jurisdiction over the general class of actions to which a particular case belongs. Truax v. State, 856 N.E.2d 116, 121-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Subject matter jurisdiction must be derived from the Constitution or statute and cannot be conferred by the consent or agreement of the parties. Id. at 122.
Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-30-1-4 (2008), a juvenile court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over certain offenses if the juvenile was sixteen years of age or older at the time of the alleged violation:
(a) The juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over an individual for an alleged
violation of:
. . .
(6) IC 35-42-5-1 (robbery) if:
(A) the robbery was committed while armed with a deadly weapon; or
(B) the robbery results in bodily injury or serious bodily injury;
. . .
if the individual was at least sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the alleged violation.
Estrada was charged with two counts of Class B felony robbery while armed with a deadly weapon and one count of Class C felony conspiracy for offenses she committed at the age of seventeen. Under subsection (a)(6)(A), the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the armed robbery charges.
. . . .
Because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the criminal charges here, the criminal prosecution of Estrada was not for offenses with which she “should have been charged” in the juvenile proceeding. Even if the successive prosecution statute applies to juvenile proceedings, Estrada has not met subsection (a)(3) of the successive prosecution statute. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Estrada’s motion to dismiss.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.