Sullivan, J.
The plaintiff claims that her husband’s death was caused by the defendant’s negligence in installing or removing asbestos-containing materials. The trial court ruled for the defendant be-cause the claim had not been brought within the time Indiana law requires for a claim arising from the construction of an “improvement to real property.” We reverse the trial court because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant’s work constituted an “improvement to real property,” as that phrase is commonly understood.
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The meaning of the term “improvement to real property” as used in the CSoR is a matter of first impression for this Court. See Pentony v. Valparaiso Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. 2:09-CV-363-JVB, 2012 WL 1095220, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2012) (Van Bokkelen, J.) (“The Court has found no Indiana cases defining the term ‘improvement to real property’ as used in Indiana Code § 32-30-1-5.”). The statute itself does not define the term. When a statute employs a word without defining it, courts generally should apply the word’s plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, unless to do so would be contrary to the Legislature’s intent; but technical words and phrases should be given their technical legal definitions. See Ind. Code § 1-1-4-1(1) (2005). Compare Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue v. Trump Ind., Inc., 814 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Ind. 2004) (applying plain and ordinary meaning of “tangible personal property” for purposes of sales and use tax), with George v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 945 N.E.2d 150, 156-57 (Ind. 2011) (applying well-established legal definition of “lottery” instead of broader common meaning). We first examine the legislative intent underlying the CSoR and then examine various meanings that have been attributed to the term “improvement to real property.”
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Despite these potential difficulties, we think that the commonsense approach best implements the Legislature’s intent. Therefore, we hold that an “improvement to real property” for purposes of the CSoR is “a permanent addition to or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairs.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1138 (unabridged ed. 1976). Put differently, an “improvement to real property” is (1) an addition to or betterment of real property; (2) that is permanent; (3) that enhances the real property’s capital value; (4) that involves the expenditure of labor or money; (5) that is designed to make the property more useful or valuable; and (6) that is not an ordinary repair. [Footnote omitted.] In applying this commonsense definition, judges and lawyers should focus on these individual criteria but they should not lose sight of the fact that this is a definition grounded in commonsense. The fact that a purported improvement satisfies each of these individual criteria may not be sufficient for it to be an improvement within the meaning of the CSoR if it would do violence to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as used in the construction context.
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Dickson, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.