ROBB, Chief Judge
The relevant rule, Indiana Evidence Rule 613(b), provides:
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to statements of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2).
It is notable that Burnette was not confronted at or before trial with the statements she made to Jones, but Rule 613(b) does not require Burnette actually explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement. Rather, the rule requires Burnette to have been “afforded an opportunity” to do so, or that the “interests of justice otherwise require.” Id. The significance of these two portions of the rule warrant further discussion.
First, Evidence Rule 613(b) generally requires Burnette to have been afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statements of which the admission into evidence is at issue, but the rule does not specify the timing of that opportunity. Our research has not revealed an Indiana appellate opinion on the timing aspect of this rule, but federal courts have discussed this issue in great detail. . . . .
. . . The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Traditionally, prior inconsistent statements of a witness could not be proved by extrinsic evidence unless and until the witness was first confronted with the impeaching statement. Rule 613(b) modifies this approach, however, by merely requiring that the witness be provided an opportunity to explain the statement at some point in the proceedings. There need be no particular
sequence or timing, so long as the witness has that opportunity to explain the statement. . . .
. . . Rule 613(b) does not supplant the traditional method of confronting a witness with his inconsistent statement prior to its introduction into evidence as the preferred method of proceeding. In fact, where the proponent of the testimony fails to do so, and the witness subsequently becomes unavailable, the proponent runs the risk that the court will properly exercise its discretion to not allow the admission of the prior statement. For this reason, most courts consider the touchstone of admissibility under Rule 613(b) to be the continued
availability of the witness for recall to explain the inconsistent statements.
Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 793 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
. . . .
Therefore, we conclude that under Indiana Evidence Rule 613(b), a witness’s requisite opportunity to explain or deny” a prior inconsistent statement may be satisfied at any point in the proceedings, with two caveats. The first caveat is that, as stated in Wammock, the traditional method of confronting a witness with the statement before extrinsic evidence is introduced into evidence remains the preferred method. The second caveat, as explained more fully below, is that the trial court has wide discretion in this matter. Indeed, as the rule states, the trial court should rule as “the interests of justice” require.
. . . .
Trial courts have discretion to admit extrinsic evidence of the prior statement even if the impeachee had no opportunity to explain or deny or if the adverse party had no opportunity to question the statement. 13 Ind. Prac., Indiana Evidence § 613.202 (3d ed. 2011). Trial courts also have discretion to require an impeachee’s opportunity to explain precede admission of extrinsic evidence of the prior statement. Evid. R. 613(b); see Evid. R. 611(a); see also Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 332 at 519-20 (2nd ed. 1994) (“Occasionally, . . . courts still insist on laying the foundation first, and it seems probable that they have authority to do so under FRE 611.”) (quoted in Della Rose, 403 F.3d at 903). In determining whether to require a specific sequence, trial courts should consider: the trial court’s inclination to allow the impeachee to be recalled as a witness to explain, the witness’s availability to be recalled, the likelihood of unfair prejudice from repetition of evidence admissible only for impeachment, 13 Ind. Prac., Indiana Evidence § 613.202, and other factors, for example, the importance of the credibility of the impeachee to the resolution of the case. [Footnote omitted.]
BAILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.