Baker, J.
Appellant-defendant Clifton Ervin brings this interlocutory appeal, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Specifically, Ervin argues that although the trial court properly granted a portion of his motion to suppress, it erred in determining that only the evidence seized from the moment that an off-duty police officer ordered him to return to his vehicle until uniformed on-duty police officers arrived at the scene should be suppressed. In other words, Ervin claims that the trial court should have issued an order “prohibiting the State from introducing all evidence obtained following Ervin’s illegal detention.” Appellant’s Br. p. 6. Concluding that the trial court properly determined that the evidence seized by the uniformed on-duty police officers should not be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule, we affirm and remand this cause for trial.
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In this case, the sole basis that Ervin advanced in support of his motion to suppress was Officer Sedberry’s alleged violation of Indiana Code section 9-30-2-2. Ervin makes no claim that his constitutional rights were violated. Rather, Ervin maintains that he was illegally arrested under this statute because Officer Sedberry was not in uniform or driving a marked police vehicle at the time of the incident.
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Given these circumstances and notwithstanding the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary, we cannot say that Indiana Code Section 9-30-2-2 was implicated to the extent that the evidence in this case should be suppressed. More specifically, the statute provides that an officer may not arrest a person “for a violation of an Indiana law regulating the use and operation of a motor vehicle on an Indiana highway” unless the officer is in uniform or a marked police vehicle. I.C. § 9-30-2-2.
At no time did Officer Sedberry arrest Ervin for violating a law regulating the use of a motor vehicle. Rather, it is apparent that Officer Sedberry’s acts of drawing his weapon and pointing the gun at Ervin were in response to the threatening and aggressive behavior that Ervin initiated, and his purpose was to keep Ervin away from his family to ensure their safety.
As a result, because Indiana Code section 9-30-2-2 is not implicated in these circumstances and Ervin does not contend that his constitutional rights were violated in this instance, the trial court properly determined that the evidence seized by the uniformed on-duty police officers should not be suppressed. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in this regard and remand this cause for trial.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and this cause is remanded for trial.
KIRSCH, J., and BROWN, J., concur.