ROBB, Chief Judge
With all that said, based on the factual record before us, we do not agree with the State that officers actually held an objective, reasonable belief that DNA evidence was about to be destroyed. Substantial evidence was presented regarding the hectic scene prior to officers obtaining the swabs. Detective Cress testified that upon first hearing about what happened, he “quickly realized that [he] needed to be at the scene because it was something that was fresh and something that recently just happened . . . .” Tr. at 289. He continued by explaining the chaotic scene that spanned the neighborhood where Lee was apprehended by Officer Hamer, and noting various officers, friends, and family members milling about. Id. at 289-90. He specifically mentioned that he was trying to “check and secure” “multiple people and multiple locations.” Id. at 290. After beginning parts of the investigation and delegating other portions to his colleagues, Detective Cress left the scene and returned to his office because Lee was also, separately, transported to an interview room in the same building as Detective Cress’s office. Either Detective Cress or another officer contacted Lee’s mother and transported her there as well because Lee was under the age of eighteen.
Detective Cress then had Lee’s mother call Lee’s cellular phone to confirm that the phone found along the route Officer Hamer chased Lee was in fact Lee’s. Detective Cress also presented Lee’s mother with a consent to search form, which included a request to consent to swab Lee’s penis. At some point, Detective Cress allowed Lee to use the restroom and assisted him in doing so, although he did not allow Lee to wash his hands. Detective Cress then accompanied Lee to the hospital for a forensic examining nurse to administer the DNA swabs of Lee’s hands, fingers, and penis.
As relates to a concern that DNA evidence was about to be destroyed, the sole evidence presented is that Detective Cress would not allow Lee be alone in the restroom or to wash his hands after he urinated. Detective Cress did not state why or otherwise elaborate. Nor did Detective Cress make any other statement to suggest his concern about destruction of DNA evidence or whether he took any precautions to ensure that Lee did not wipe his hands or penis on his clothing or any other surfaces.
A crime lab technician later testified as to the fragility of DNA evidence, but a lab technician’s testimony does not reflect the beliefs of arresting or investigating officers. We will not impute a lab technician’s knowledge of the fragility of DNA evidence to that of a field detective. It would not be reasonable to do so, especially when other evidence in the record suggests that if Detective Cress knew what the lab technician knew, Detective Cress might have attempted to obtain a DNA swab prior to allowing Lee to urinate at all; the technician testified that urination can destroy DNA evidence. Tr. at 916. Further, the evidence presented suggests Detective Cress was more concerned with obtaining Mother’s consent to swab Lee’s penis than he was with Lee destroying evidence. If Detective Cress actually believed the evidence was about to be destroyed and exigent circumstances existed, there was no reason to obtain Lee’s mother’s consent (or perhaps even Lee’s, for that matter).
The absence of evidence that officers actually believed DNA was about to be destroyed might be due to a lack of evidence that would sufficiently support the State’s appellate claim that the officers did so believe, or it might be due to Lee’s failure to object and thereby press the State to present evidence thereof. In any event, our narrowly tailored holding is that sufficient evidence of exigent circumstances was not presented at trial. Because it is the State’s burden to present such evidence to overcome a presumption of unreasonableness, its failure to overcome that burden renders the admission of such evidence erroneous without another valid justification.
RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.