BARTEAU, Senior Judge
In United States v. Pittman, 411 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2005), a police officer accompanied by a civilian observer pulled over the defendant’s car because the rear license plate was not illuminated as required by Illinois law. When the defendant pulled to the side of the road, his passenger leapt out and ran. The passenger was found hiding in the basement of a house and placed in the backseat of the officer’s car. The civilian observer then told the officer that as soon as the officer disappeared in pursuit of the passenger, the defendant fled as well. The officer searched the car’s glove compartment, and the evidence found in that search was challenged on appeal. As one basis for upholding the search, the Seventh Circuit determined that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered because the police department had an established policy of conducting an inventory search when a vehicle is abandoned. The court then stated, “If the driver of a car flees at the approach of the police, this is pretty good evidence that he’s abandoned the car—that he doesn’t want to be associated with it and therefore isn’t going to reclaim it.” Id. at 817. 8
We find similar evidence of abandonment here. Upon learning that the registered owner of the maroon Mazda had a suspended driver’s license and two outstanding arrest warrants, Officer Lamar initiated a traffic stop. Before Officer Lamar approached, Wilson fled. This is evidence that Wilson abandoned the vehicle.
Wilson attempts to refute this evidence of abandonment by pointing out that he locked the vehicle and took the keys with him. This argument is unpersuasive. First, Officer Lamar did not know where the keys were. Moreover, the fact that the vehicle was locked does not necessarily negate a reasonable inference that Wilson abandoned it. The vehicle was not parked on Wilson’s own property or on the property of any acquaintance but instead left in the parking lot of a strip club. There is no evidence that the police knew of anyone else around to whom Wilson may have entrusted the vehicle. By abandoning the vehicle, Wilson relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in it. His Fourth Amendment argument therefore fails.
MAY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.