RUCKER, J.
In this case the State offered, concurrently with its strike of venireperson Bard, reasons for the strike:
For the record I put a preempt on Bard for the reasons that he has indicated that he does not wish to serve. He has health issues. He says he has trouble listening, and he mentioned on his prior convictions that a family member had been convicted of conversion, and his potential knowledge of witnesses.
Tr. at 140. Cartwright then stated “Well, I object under Batson. . . . [f]or the record, Mr. Bard is the only black man in the jury box, an[d] the entire venire.” Tr. at 140. The trial court then stated:
All right, and for purposes of the record under Batson [v.] Kentucky, the Court does not find a prima fa[cie] case of discrimination at this time, but despite that, the State has given their . . . reasons . . . . so I don‟t find a pattern at this time. However, the State has on record indicated what their reasons are.
Tr. at 141. Then, after a discussion with the court reporter as to whether she was able to hear and record the Batson exchange that took place at the bench, the trial court excused the jurors from the courtroom and held a separate Batson hearing on the strike of venireperson Bard. See Tr. at 143. During the hearing, Cartwright argued that under Batson he “is allowed to have Mr. Bard as a juror in this case. . . . [because] he is the only black man in the venire, and [Cartwright] is a black man.” Tr. at 144. This was the extent of Cartwright’s Batson argument before the trial court. [Footnote omitted.] The State again gave its
race-neutral reasons, the only difference being that it did not reiterate the reason related to Bard’s potential knowledge of witnesses. See Tr. at 149-50. The trial court then declined to find a prima facie case of discrimination, but noted that “the State wanted to give their race neutral reasons anyway, they have made those race neutral reasons on the record, and for that reason I deny your Batson challenge.” Tr. at 151.
The trial court incorrectly found no prima facie case of discrimination under the circumstances present here. Our cases are clear that “the removal of ‘the only . . . African American juror that could have served on the petit jury’” is sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Batson. Addison, slip op. at 6 (quoting McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ind. 2004)). But as the Court of Appeals correctly observed, “where, as here, a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination becomes moot.” Cartwright, 950 N.E.2d at 811. Accord Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 (recognizing that in the Batson context, “where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant” (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (brackets omitted)).
On transfer Cartwright argues that the United States Supreme Court decision in Snyder mandates the conclusion that the strike of Bard was racially motivated. Cartwright declares that Snyder “held that under the third step of Batson, the trial court must thoroughly analyze the State’s proffered reasons for striking an African-American juror from the jury panel.” Def.’s Resp. to Trans. at 7. Cartwright urges that Snyder requires a trial court to explicitly state its reasons for deciding a Batson challenge. We do not read Snyder so expansively. Although Snyder recognized that the trial court ultimately must make the determination of discrimination, and the Court in Snyder noted that there, the trial court did not provide reasons for its Batson ruling, Snyder did not declare that trial courts must do so. Indeed in a recent post-Snyder opinion, at least one federal circuit has declared “federal law has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge, especially where a prima facie case is acknowledged and the prosecution presents specific nondiscriminatory reasons on the record.” Stenhouse v. Hobbs, 631 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
In Snyder, the prosecution offered two reasons for its strike of African American venireperson Brooks: (1) that he “looked very nervous” and (2) that he stated he was concerned about taking time away from his student teaching obligation to sit on the jury. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court judge had included no express finding as to Brooks‟ demeanor – i.e., his nervousness – in the record. And because demeanor cannot be shown from a “cold record” without a specific finding by the trial court, the Court refused to credit the prosecutor’s demeanor-based reason for striking Brooks. Id. at 479.
The Court then examined the record for evidence supporting the strike of Brooks based on his concern about missing his student teaching obligation, a requirement for his degree. In essence, the Court found that Brooks had been rehabilitated on this issue because Brooks’ purported concern appeared to have dissipated after the trial court spoke with his dean and assured him that the jury service would not pose a problem. See id. at 482-83. The Court further compared Brooks to similarly situated seated jurors and found that the State had accepted at least two white jurors who had expressed similar concerns about having conflicting obligations. Id. at 483-84. In light of this, and because there was nothing in the record showing that the trial judge credited the nervousness justification, the Court concluded that the defendant’s Batson challenge should have succeeded.
By contrast, in this case all of the States proffered reasons for the strike of Bard were race-neutral, and none were demeanor-based. After examining the record, as did the Supreme Court in Snyder, we find no evidence of pretext in the State’s strike of venireperson Bard. Bard volunteered on voir dire examination that he did not wish to serve on the jury. Tr. at 126. He stated that he was taking a diuretic which caused him “a frequent problem of going to the restroom.” Tr. at 127, 31. He also stated, “I’m not a good listener, but . . . but that’s from all my life even school.” Tr. at 127. And on his juror questionnaire, he responded “Yes conversion” to the question “Have you or any of your immediate family members been charged with or convicted of a crime.” Appellant’s Appendix at 118.2 The prosecutor did not run afoul of Batson for striking Bard based on these statements.
. . . .
In sum, Cartwright essentially argues that the State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate its strike of Bard was not motivated by discriminatory purpose. But the State had no such burden under Batson. The State was only required to come forth with race-neutral reasons for striking Bard, and it did so. It was Cartwright’s burden to demonstrate that those reasons were pretextual. He has not carried his burden.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and David, JJ., concur.