NAJAM, J.
M.M. and D.H. walked around to the dimly lit area behind the store, where there was a picnic table. M.M. asked for a kiss, but D.H. refused. Next M.M. asked for a kiss on the cheek, and D.H. obliged. M.M. then “grabbed [her] closer and tried to kiss [her]” and “put his hands on [her] and like pushed [her] butt[.]” Transcript at 35. D.H. told M.M.to “get off” of her. Id. M.M. released D.H. and walked away. As he left, he seemed angry and yelled that D.H. would be getting a letter in the mail.
The State charged M.M. with sexual battery, as a Class D felony . . . .
. . . .
M.M. is correct that D.H. did not testify that she feared M.M. But fear is not an element of sexual battery. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-8(a)(1). Nor is fear a prerequisite to proving force or imminent threat of force. Id. However, it may be evidence of force or threat of force. See Chatham, 845 N.E.2d at 208 (where victim’s fear arose after the battery, evidence did not indicate she was compelled by force or threat of force to submit to battery). Again, force “may be implied from the circumstances,” Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 731, and we must consider the victim’s perspective in order to determine the presence or absence of forceful compulsion. Tobias, 666 N.E.2d at 72. Thus, the issue here is whether D.H. perceived that she was compelled to submit to the groping of her buttocks through force or threat of force. We cannot say that the State proved that element in this case.
Evidence that a victim did not voluntarily consent to a touching does not, in itself, support the conclusion that the defendant compelled the victim to submit to the touching by force or threat of force. Smith v. State, 678 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Scott-Gordon v. State, 579 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. 1991)), trans. denied. Not all touchings intended to arouse or satisfy sexual desires constitute sexual battery; only those in which the person touched is compelled to submit by force or imminent threat of force violate Indiana Code § 35-42-4-8. Id. (citing Scott-Gordon, 579 N.E.2d at 604).
. . . .
. . . The means used to commit sexual battery as alleged in the charging instrument included all the elements of battery as a class B misdemeanor. The State established that M.M. grabbed D.H.’s buttocks. This evidence is sufficient to prove that M.M. committed battery as a class B misdemeanor. Accordingly, we reverse M.M.’s sexual battery conviction and remand with instructions to enter judgment for battery as a class B misdemeanor and to resentence him accordingly.
ROBB, C.J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.