CRONE, J.
In 2006, Jessica Bowling agreed to plead guilty to class A felony neglect of a dependent, and the State agreed to a cap of forty years on the executed portion of her sentence. Along with the plea agreement, Bowling signed a written advisement and waiver of rights that contained the following provision: “By pleading guilty you have agreed to waive your right to appeal your sentence so long as the Judge sentences you within the terms of your plea agreement.” Appellant‟s App. at 22. The trial court sentenced Bowling to forty years, executed.
In 2011, Bowling filed a petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2. The State argued that Bowling waived her right to appeal her sentence pursuant to the aforementioned provision. The trial court agreed with the State and denied Bowling’s petition. Bowling appeals, arguing that the waiver should not be enforced because it is a misstatement of law. We conclude that the waiver is valid and therefore affirm the trial court.
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The language in paragraph 10 is similar to that in Creech [v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 2008)]. [Footnote omitted.] There, the defendant’s written plea agreement contained the following provision:
I understand that I have a right to appeal my sentence if there is an open plea. An open plea is an agreement which leaves my sentence to the Judge’s discretion. I hereby waive my right to appeal my sentence so long as the Judge sentences me within the terms of my plea agreement.
887 N.E.2d at 74. Our supreme court held that this “express language” was enforceable. Id. at 76. In so holding, the court rejected Creech’s argument that because the trial court erroneously advised Creech at the end of his sentencing hearing that he retained the right to appeal his sentence his waiver was not knowing and voluntary. The supreme court noted that “most waivers are effective when set out in writing and signed,” and “[t]he content and language of the plea agreement itself, as well as the colloquy where necessary, govern the determination as to the validity of the waiver.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
Bowling attempts to distinguish Creech by arguing that in her case the trial court failed to advise her that she had a right to appeal her sentence. However, in Creech, the trial court’s erroneous statement to Creech at the sentencing hearing indicating that he had the right to appeal his sentence served as the basis for Creech’s argument on appeal that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. [Footnote omitted.] Here, Bowling cannot claim that she was confused by any statement provided by the trial court because the trial court did not provide her with incorrect information. Thus, the difference between the cases that Bowling highlights actually reveals that her argument is weaker than Creech’s.
In any event, “’a specific dialogue with the judge is not a necessary prerequisite to a valid waiver of appeal, if there is other evidence in the record demonstrating a knowing and voluntary waiver.’” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Agee, 83 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 1996)). Here, during the guilty plea hearing, Bowling agreed that she had received the Advisement, had read it, had gone over it with her attorney, understood it, and signed it. Appellant’s App. at 10
43-44. We conclude that the content and language of the Advisement and the trial court’s discussion of it with Bowling at the guilty plea hearing are sufficient to support enforcement of the waiver in paragraph 10. [Footnote omitted.]
Although we prefer the waiver language in Creech over that in paragraph 10, paragraph 10 sufficiently informs a defendant that although she has a right to appeal an open sentence, she is agreeing to waive that right as part of her plea agreement. That said, to avoid even the possibility of confusion, such a waiver provision would be improved by using the following language or language similar thereto: “As a condition of entering this plea agreement, I knowingly and voluntarily agree to waive my right to appeal my sentence on the basis that it is erroneous or for any other reason so long as the Judge sentences me within the terms of my plea agreement.” In addition, it would be helpful to include a waiver of the right to appeal an open sentence in the plea agreement itself, as well as any written advisement and waiver of rights that is executed along with the plea agreement.
MAY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.