VAIDIK, J.
Before 1983, Indiana’s probation revocation statute stated in part: “If it shall appear that the defendant has violated the terms of his probation or has been found guilty of having committed another offense, the court may revoke the probation or the suspension of sentence and may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.” Ind. Code § 35-7-2-2 (Burns 1975). While the old statute did not articulate a specific legal standard to use in evaluating a potential probation violation, courts determined that a probable-cause determination was all that was required for determining whether a new offense was committed. See, e.g., Hoffa v. State, 368 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Ind. 1977) (“the trial court on the basis of evidence submitted at a probation revocation hearing found that the arrest was reasonable and further found that there was probable cause for belief that the defendant had violated the criminal law of this state . . . .”) (emphasis added).
The current statute, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(e), was implemented in 1983, the same year that the old statute for probation revocation was repealed by P.L. 311-1983, Section 49. Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(e) explicitly states that probation violations must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
A line of cases, starting with Weatherly v. State, 564 N.E.2d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), have relied on cases that cite the old statute [footnote omitted]; “[e]vidence must be presented from which the trial judge could reasonably conclude that the arrest was appropriate and that there is probable cause to believe the defendant violated a criminal law before the revocation may be sustained.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gee v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)). These cases have relied on out-of-date law. We note that today the correct legal standard in determining if a person on probation has committed another offense is a preponderance of the evidence, as is articulated in the current Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(e).
Heaton contends that the trial court used a “probable cause” standard in finding that she had committed the theft. In its ruling, the trial court said “to the extent that this Court only has to make a probable cause determination, that is that a charge was filed and it is, and it is supported by probable cause, that’s clearly the case here.” Tr. p. 74. The State argues that the trial court used the correct standard because earlier in the testimony, the court said, “[a]nd so if there is no refutation the Court will find on this evidence that there is a preponderance of evidence to support the allegation of theft.” Id. at 40. This statement, however, was made before Heaton had a chance to present testimony to refute the testimony presented by the State. Heaton was not present at the first part of the evidentiary hearing, id. at 13, so the trial court left the transcript open for her to testify at another time. After hearing Heaton’s testimony, the trial court noted that the State had presented probable cause that she had committed a theft while on probation. Id. at 74. This was the incorrect legal standard, so the trial court did abuse its discretion.
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As a result of the trial court using the wrong legal standard for the commission of another offense, we cannot be sure that the trial court would have imposed the same punishment of eighteen months executed at the IDOC for three technical violations alone. We therefore instruct the trial court to use the correct legal standard to determine whether Heaton violated her probation with the new arrest and resentence her in light of the new findings.
ROBB, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.