KIRSCH, J.
On October 15, 2009, law enforcement arrested McCloud, and the next day, October 16, the State charged McCloud with four misdemeanor offenses. At an October 19 pretrial conference, McCloud requested an early trial pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4, and the matter was scheduled for a court trial on November 30, 2009. On October 20, 2009, McCloud posted bond and was released. The parties appeared for trial on November 30, 2009, but the State moved for a continuance, which the trial court granted over McCloud’s objection. The trial court set a new trial date of February 9, 2010. McCloud failed to appear for trial on February 9, 2010, and an arrest warrant was issued.
On March 26, 2010, the surety agent on McCloud’s October 2009 bond filed a “Petition to Release Surety,” which stated that McCloud was “currently incarcerated in the Federal Transfer Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma” and requested the trial court to release liability on the bond. Appellant’s App. at 29-33. Attached to the petition was a document that indicated McCloud was a federal inmate, was located in Oklahoma City FTC, and had an expected release date of October 8, 2010. 1 Appellant’s App. at 32.
Approximately seven months later, on October 13, 2010, the trial court held a warrant surrender hearing, where McCloud appeared with counsel. At the hearing, McCloud explained that he was on probation for a federal handgun offense when he was arrested on the current Indiana charges in October 2009. Consequently, he was in violation of his federal probation. In December 2009, he appeared at a federal probation violation hearing and admitted the probation violation. McCloud served his federal sentence with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in Illinois, until being released in August 2010, when he was sent to the Volunteers of America in Indianapolis (“VOA”) to complete the last two months of his federal sentence in the VOA’s work-release program. While at the VOA, he violated the terms of that placement, and he was taken into federal custody. In late September or early October, McCloud was released from federal custody and transferred to state custody at the Marion County Jail. [Footnote omitted.]
At the October 13, 2010 warrant surrender hearing, McCloud’s counsel argued that, although McCloud had been in federal custody for approximately ten months, the State was required to bring him to trial on or before Friday, October 15, 2010 in order to comply with the Criminal Rule 4(C) one-year deadline. . . . .
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Initially, we note that McCloud was incarcerated in federal prison in another state for approximately ten months of that one-year period. Indiana has denominated two methods of securing the presence of defendants who are in custody of foreign jurisdictions, and, because McCloud was imprisoned out of state, we find that a brief discussion of them is warranted.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“IAD”) is codified in Indiana at Indiana
Code section 35-33-10-4, and the writ of habeus corpus ad prosequendum is codified at Indiana Code section 35-33-10-5. See Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 94-95 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999). “While the statutes are separate and distinct, they have similar purposes in that both set forth procedural safeguards for securing the presence of a prisoner in Indiana who is located in a foreign jurisdiction.” Id.
Indiana is one of forty-eight states who, along with the District of Columbia and the Federal Government, is a party to the IAD. Conn v. State, 831 N.E.2d 828, 830-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001), trans. denied. The IAD is an interstate compact and its purpose is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges against persons incarcerated in other jurisdictions. Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 96. The IAD process begins when the state bringing the charges against a defendant, who is in custody in another IAD jurisdiction, files a detainer. [Footnote omitted.] Robinson v. State, 863 N.E.2d 894, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied (2007). After a detainer is filed, the inmate/defendant may file a request for final disposition, which triggers the requirement under the IAD that he be brought to trial within 180 days. Id.; see also Conn, 831 N.E.2d at 830-31. There is no mandate obligating the State to file a detainer. Fisher v. State, 933 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Absent the filing of a detainer under the IAD, the IAD is not applicable. Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 98. Because the State did not file a detainer in this case, we find the IAD does not apply to McCloud’s case.
Turning to the other method of securing the presence of a prisoner in Indiana who is being held in another jurisdiction, the writ of habeus corpus ad prosequendum (“Writ”), Indiana Code section 35-33-10-5, provides that Indiana courts have authority to issue a Writ in order to secure the presence of prisoners for criminal prosecution. It has origins dating back to the first Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 81, section 14 (1798). Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 96. Essentially, a Writ is a written request for temporary custody of a prisoner. The United States Supreme Court identified three main differences between detainers and Writs.
First, a Writ may only be issued by a court, whereas a detainer may be lodged against a prisoner either upon the initiative of a prosecutor or law enforcement officer. Second, a Writ requires the immediate presence of the prisoner but a detainer merely notifies prison authorities that the prisoner is wanted in another jurisdiction upon release to face pending criminal charges. If a detainer is lodged, the receiving state must take further action in order to obtain temporary custody over the prisoner. Finally, because a Writ requires immediate action, it is valid only for a short period of time. On the other hand, a detainer may remain lodged against the prisoner for a lengthy period of time, even for the span of the prisoner’s sentence.
Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 97 (citing United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)) (internal citations omitted). While Indiana Code section 35-33-10-5 gives Indiana courts the “authority” to issue Writs to secure prisoners for trial in this state, it does not require them to do so. Because no Writ was issued in this case, we find it, like the IAD, is inapplicable to our resolution of this case. Therefore, we now turn to the issues presented, namely whether the trial court erred when it denied McCloud’s motion to dismiss pending charges, either because of the time limits of Criminal Rule 4(C) or pursuant to constitutional protections.
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Before determining whether Criminal Rule 4(C) was violated, we must first determine whether the rule applies here at all; ultimately, we conclude that it does. We acknowledge that our colleagues have stated that Criminal Rule 4 “‘does not apply when a person is incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction.’” Fisher, 933 N.E.2d at 529 (quoting Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). However, in Sweeney, our Supreme Court explained that the Howard court relied, in part, on Heflin v. State, 275 Ind. 197, 416 N.E.2d 121, 124 (Ind. 1981), where the IAD was applicable (and thus Criminal Rule 4 was not) because a detainer had been lodged by Indiana authorities on a defendant who was in federal prison. The Sweeney Court explained that in Heflin, “[T]he IAD was applicable . . . because a detainer had been lodged and not simply because the defendant was in a foreign jurisdiction.” Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 100 (emphasis added). It also clarified that
[w]here the legislature has prescribed an alternate set of time deadlines as part of a broader statutory scheme as it has done in the IAD, we properly subordinate Criminal Rule 4 thereto.
Id. In Sweeney, where no detainer was filed and the IAD did not apply, the defendant was entitled to the protections of Criminal Rule 4, and the Court proceeded to determine whether the defendant’s Criminal Rule 4 rights were violated. [Footnote omitted.] We will do likewise here and evaluate McCloud’s situation under Criminal Rule 4(C). [Footnote omitted.]
Here, McCloud was arrested on October 15, 2009 and charged the next day. McCloud asserts that under Criminal Rule 4(C) he should have been brought to trial within one year, by October 16, 2010. The question we consider is whether McCloud’s federal incarceration outside the State of Indiana for approximately ten months, from December 2009 to September or October 2010, tolled the Criminal Rule 4 clock and thereby extended the date by which the State was required to prosecute McCloud. We conclude that it did.
McCloud was not in Indiana for almost ten months, and not within Indiana’s exclusive control, during this time. The reason for McCloud’s absence was his federal incarceration stemming from the violation of probation for a prior handgun offense. We have held, “[I]f a delay is caused by the defendant’s . . . action, the one-year time limit is extended accordingly.” Blasko, 920 N.E.2d at 792. As the trial court observed, “[W]hy [should] the ten months that he’s been in federal custody and unavailable . . . be counted against the State for that one (1) year period?” Tr. at 31. Like the trial court, we decline to attribute that time period of McCloud’s incarceration to the State for purposes of the Criminal Rule 4 timeline.
BAKER, J., and BROWN, J., concur.