VAIDIK, J.
The State charged Jones with Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine and Class B misdemeanor visiting a common nuisance. Before trial, law enforcement officers utilized a Hazmat team to destroy some of the chemicals and chemically contaminated materials found in the Mossholder garage. At trial, Jones moved to exclude evidence of any item not received by him in discovery, claiming that law enforcement officers had failed to comply with Indiana Code section 35-33-5-5, which governs the disposition of property held as evidence and authorizes law enforcement to destroy chemicals, controlled substances, and chemically contaminated equipment associated with the manufacture of drugs. As a result, Jones argued, testimony or photographs offered in lieu of the destroyed physical evidence should not be admitted. The evidence at issue—a photograph of the one-pot reaction vessel and testimony regarding that vessel, as well as numerous photos and testimony regarding chemicals and other materials found in the garage—was admitted over Jones’ objections.
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Criminal defendants have the right to examine physical evidence in the possession of the State under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. Terry v. State, 857 N.E.2d 396, 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. However, the State does not have “an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)). In the context of hazardous chemicals and materials, tension arises between the practical need for destruction and the threat of prejudice to the substantial rights of a criminal defendant, which necessarily occurs when evidence is destroyed.
Indiana Code section 35-33-5-5 attempts to resolve this tension. [Footnote omitted.] Specifically, Section 35-33-5-5(e) sets forth requirements that must be satisfied before evidence may be destroyed:
(e) A law enforcement agency may destroy or cause to be destroyed chemicals, controlled substances, or chemically contaminated equipment (including drug paraphernalia as described in IC 35-48-4-8.5) associated with the illegal manufacture of drugs or controlled substances without a court order if all the following conditions are met:
(1) The law enforcement agency collects and preserves a sufficient quantity of the chemicals, controlled substances, or chemically contaminated equipment to demonstrate that the chemicals, controlled substances, or chemically contaminated equipment was associated with the illegal manufacture of drugs or controlled substances.
(2) The law enforcement agency takes photographs of the illegal drug manufacturing site that accurately depict the presence and quantity of chemicals, controlled substances, and chemically contaminated equipment.
(3) The law enforcement agency completes a chemical inventory report that describes the type and quantities of chemicals, controlled substances, and chemically contaminated equipment present at the illegal manufacturing site.
The photographs and description of the property shall be admissible into evidence in place of the actual physical evidence.
The statute sets forth additional provisions concerning the maintenance of certified records and two-witness attestation:
(f) for purposes of preserving the record of any conviction on appeal, a photograph demonstrating the nature of the property, and an adequate description of the property must be obtained before the disposition of the property. In the event of a retrial, the photograph and description of the property shall be admissible into evidence in place of the actual physical evidence. All other rules of law governing the admissibility of evidence shall apply to the photographs.
(g) the law enforcement agency disposing of property in any manner provided in subsection (b), (c), or (e) shall maintain certified records of any disposition under subsection (b), (c), or (e). Disposition by destruction of property shall be witnessed by two (2) persons who shall also attest to the destruction.
Ind. Code § 35-33-5-5(e), (g). Jones argues that certain photographic and testimonial evidence should not have been admitted into evidence because officers failed to comply with subsections (e), (f), and (g). He claims that the remedy for the officers’ violation of these subsections is exclusion of the evidence.
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As it is currently written, subsections (f) and (g) provide no remedy for law enforcement’s noncompliance. Where subsection (e) predicates admission of evidence upon satisfaction of the listed conditions, subsections (f) and (g) contain no such limiting language. In the absence of such language, we decline to premise admissibility of evidence upon the satisfaction of the requirements listed in this provision. Jones’ arguments regarding the maintenance of certified records and the two-witness attestation requirement must fail. [Footnote omitted.]
We reach a different conclusion with regard to subsection (e). The subsection’s structure, specifically the predicatory language “if all the following conditions are met,” the three procedural requirements that follow, and the conclusion that the photographic or descriptive evidence “shall be admissible . . . in the place of the actual physical evidence” implies the evidence would be inadmissible if law enforcement failed to comply with the provisions of the subsection.
As to subsection (e), Jones contends that law enforcement officers did not preserve a sufficient quantity of the chemicals, controlled substances, or chemically contaminated equipment as required by Section 35-33-5-5(e)(1). Jones further alleges that officers did not take photographs of the illegal drug manufacturing site that accurately depict the presence and quantity of chemicals, controlled substances, and chemically contaminated equipment, in violation of Section 35-33-5-5(e)(2). Finally, Jones claims that a chemical inventory report was not completed as required by Section 35-33-5-5(e)(3).
Jones directs our attention to the testimony of Officer Joshua Maller. Maller testified that he did not collect samples from certain items of evidence, as he believed that sufficient evidence had already been gathered and that the item at issue was identical to another item at the scene, from which samples were taken. Tr. p. 44. Maller also testified that he did not list the quantity of certain items found in the Mossholder garage in the property record. When asked if the quantity was listed elsewhere, Maller indicated that the quantity would be indicated in photos taken of the manufacture site as well as in the case report. Id. at 52. Maller also stated that he had not made note of the measurement of chemicals destroyed in the property record nor had he listed the “potential chemicals” destroyed. Id. at 53.
Having heard the testimony of law enforcement officers and having examined evidence presented with regard to this issue, the trial court concluded that the law enforcement officers had complied with the requirements of Section (e)(1) and (2), stating:
I think what’s been introduced at this point shows that [law enforcement officers] have maintained a sufficient quantity of chemicals and controlled substances and chemically contaminated equipment to demonstrate that these items were associated with the illegal manufacture of controlled substances. . . . [I] think that the photographs accurately depict the present [sic] and quantity of the chemicals, controlled substances and chemically contaminated equipment within the illegal manufacturing site. . . .
Tr. p. 77-78. We cannot say this determination was an abuse of discretion. Notably, extensive evidence of the manufacture of methamphetamine, more than forty exhibits, was recovered from the Mossholder garage. Though some of this evidence was destroyed, other items were preserved. The items preserved by law enforcement were available to Jones for examination and independent chemical testing. Officers also took numerous photos of the chemicals and equipment found in the garage. Jones does not claim that law enforcement’s alleged failures deprived him of a fair opportunity to be heard in court or otherwise indicate that he was prejudiced by these alleged failures. Nor does Jones contend that the State destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence. [Footnote omitted.] We cannot say that the trial court erred when concluding that sufficient quantities of evidence were maintained and the photos taken by officers adequately depicted the scene.
We recognize, as Officer Maller admitted, that law enforcement did not fully comply with Section 35-33-5-5(e)(3), which requires the completion of a chemical inventory report. However, Maller testified that this deficiency could be rectified by examining other records, such as the case report or photographs of the manufacture site. The trial court found that officers had substantially complied with the statutory section, stating, “[I] think that the, between the case report and the returns, [law enforcement officers] have maintained a sufficient chemical inventory report and completed a sufficient one.” Id. We cannot say this determination was an abuse of discretion. See Bowles v. State, 820 N.E.2d 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
DARDEN, J., concurs.
FRIEDLANDER, J., Concurs in Result Without Opinion as to Issue I [the issue above]. Concurs as to Issue II and III.