BROWN, J.
Toshiano Ishii, Matthew Stone, Greg Hardin, Lisa Hardin, William Neely, and Michael Grider (on their own behalf and on behalf of Defendants and others appearing before the Marion County Traffic Court) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss of the Honorable William E. Young, Judge. Appellants raise one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court properly granted Judge Young’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.
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On December 27, 2010, Judge Young filed a motion to dismiss arguing in part that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the actions of another court or to issue a writ of mandate or prohibition against another superior court and that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the procedures of the Marion County Traffic and Parking Court. The parties filed briefs in support of their respective positions on the motion to dismiss, and on March 7, 2011 the court held a hearing.
On March 15, 2011, the court entered an Order on Application for Default Judgment, Motion to Certify Class and Motion to Dismiss, in which the court denied Appellants’ application for default judgment and motion for class certification and granted Judge Young’s motion to dismiss….
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The issue is whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a mandate or injunction against Judge Young. [Footnote omitted.] “If the facts before the trial court are not in dispute, then the question of subject matter jurisdiction is purely one of law.” Reel v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 917 N.E.2d 714, 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Thus, we review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition and that Appellants lacked standing. Specifically, Appellants argue that their claims do not fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Indiana Supreme Court, that “[i]ndeed [Appellants] would have loved nothing more than to file the complaint as an original action with the Indiana Supreme Court,” and that their “claims could not have been brought as an original action to the [Indiana] Supreme Court and were properly brought before the trial court.” Appellants’ Brief at 3, 6. Appellants also argue that they have standing to pursue their claims against Judge Young under the public standing doctrine and that their claims are not moot.
Judge Young argues that “[t]he trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the procedures of another superior court.” Appellee’s Brief at 7. Judge Young argues that “[t]he judicial immunity of judges . . . is based, in part, on the idea that the proper remedy for errors in court proceedings is an appeal, not a civil action against the judge,” that “[t]hat same reasoning leads to the conclusion that one trial court cannot review the actions of another trial court,” that “[r]eview is a matter for appeal,” that if Appellants “had prevailed in this lawsuit, every finding of guilt and fine imposed by Judge Young would be subject to attack in another trial court,” and that “this action was properly dismissed based on the unavailability of review in the trial court under these circumstances.” Id. at 7-8. Judge Young further argues that “[t]he trial court correctly found it lacked jurisdiction to issue . . . a writ in this case against another superior court” and that the “Indiana Supreme Court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over actions for writs of mandamus against inferior courts.” Id. at 8.
In their reply brief, Appellants argue that they were not required to appeal their own convictions, that they “could not obtain the desired relief through the appellate process,” and that that they “do not seek to hold Judge Young personally responsible for monetary damages” but “merely seek that he be required to take certain actions and prohibited from taking others.” Appellants’ Reply Brief at 2, 4. Appellants further assert that the Appellate Rules, Original Action Rules, and State Constitution do not prevent a trial court judge from issuing a writ of mandamus or prohibition to another trial court judge on matters not pertaining to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
In their Complaint, Appellants clearly requested an “Order of Prohibition” and an “Order of Mandamus.” Appellants’ Appendix at 22-23. However, the Indiana Supreme Court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over actions for writs of mandamus and prohibition against inferior courts, and the reason for this rule is that the Indiana Supreme Court alone has authority over the supervision of State courts. See Ind. Const. Art. 7, § 4 (“Jurisdiction of Supreme Court”); Ind. Appellate Rule 4(B)(3) (noting the Indiana Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the supervision of courts, including issuance of writs of mandate and prohibition); Ind. Original Action Rules 1(A) and (B) (same); see also Chissell v. State, 705 N.E.2d 501, 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Based upon the record, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the Complaint and granted Judge Young’s motion to dismiss. [Footnote omitted.]
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.