VAIDIK, J.
Linzy C. Clark appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the notice of probation violation because the State did not file it within forty-five days of receiving notice of the violation. This case presents a unique question because Clark’s probation was transferred from Madison County to Tippecanoe County. Tippecanoe County – the receiving court with supervisory authority – had notice of Clark’s violation, but Madison County – the sentencing court – did not. Because we find that notice to the receiving court is notice to the sentencing court and Madison County did not file the notice within forty-five days of receiving notice of the violation, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Clark’s motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse the trial court.
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By September 2006, Clark’s probation had been transferred from Madison County to Tippecanoe County. When Clark’s probation was transferred to Tippecanoe County, the expiration date of his probation was listed as January 27, 2011. Tr. p. 11. However, because credit time was not included, Clark’s probation should have actually expired on November 29, 2010. Id. at 12.
In November 2006, Tippecanoe County sent Madison County its one and only progress report on Clark. Because it had not received any progress reports from Tippecanoe County in the following four years, Madison County finally requested an update on Clark in November 2010. Id. at 8. On January 26, 2011, Trena Murphy in the Madison County Probation Department received an email from Deanna Moell in the Tippecanoe County Probation Department stating that Clark’s “case was closed [on September 27, 2007,] per Heather Bozell,” who worked in Elwood City Court. [Footnote omitted.] Id. at 9. Murphy informed Moell that Bozell did not work for the Madison County Probation Department and therefore had no authority to close out Clark’s probation. Id. Moell then informed Murphy that Clark was currently on probation in Tippecanoe County for two other cases.
Armed with this information, on February 7, 2011, Murphy from the Madison County Probation Department filed a notice of probation violation in Madison Circuit Court. Appellant’s App. p. 19. The notice of probation violation alleged that Clark violated his probation by committing numerous new offenses – on April 4, 2007 (referred to as 3a in the notice), September 19, 2007 (3b), November 19, 2008 (3c), December 23, 2008 (3d), March 18, 2009 (3e), December 22, 2009 (3f), and April 12, 2010 (3g) – in Tippecanoe County. Id. at 19-20. The notice of probation violation also alleged that Clark failed to pay court costs, restitution, probation fees, and a fine. Id. at 20.
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[3 As for the allegation that Clark failed to pay court costs, restitution, probation fees, and a fine, the record reveals that Clark’s admission was sparse. That is, Clark merely testified that he “failed to pay all [his] court costs, restitution, fees and fines that were previously ordered.” Tr. p. 22. No information was elicited about his ability to pay these fees. As our Supreme Court recently said, “As provided by Indiana’s statutory scheme, probation may be revoked for violation of a probation condition but, for violations of financial conditions, only if the probationer recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay.” Runyon v. State, 939 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. 2010). Because there is no evidence that Clark recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally failed to pay these fees, we find that his probation revocation cannot properly be based on these violations of his financial conditions.]
. . . .
Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3 provides:
(a) The court may revoke a person’s probation if:
(1) the person has violated a condition of probation during the probationary period; and
(2) the petition to revoke probation is filed during the probationary period or before the earlier of the following:
(A) One (1) year after the termination of probation.
(B) Forty-five (45) days after the state receives notice of the violation.
(Emphases added). The forty-five-day deadline is only triggered in cases where the State received notice of the violation less than forty-five days before the defendant’s probationary term expired or after the term expired. Louth, 705 N.E.2d at 1060.
. . . The State concedes that it filed the notice of probation violation “after the expiration of [Clark’s] probationary period” and therefore subsection (a)(2)(A) or (B) must be satisfied. Appellee’s Br. p. 7. The State argues, however, that the Madison County Probation Department learned of Clark’s probation violation on January 26, 2011, and then filed the notice of probation violation on February 7, 2011, which was well within forty-five days and therefore timely according to subsection (a)(2)(B).
. . . .
The Indiana Judicial Center has issued guidelines for the Intrastate Transfer of Adult Probation Supervision. See Indiana Judicial Center, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/probation/intrastate.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). The receiving court (in this case, Tippecanoe County) has the following responsibilities:
A. The receiving court must accept intrastate transfer of an offender from the sentencing court if the offender resides in the receiving county.
* * * * *
D. The receiving court shall notify the sentencing court’s probation contact person of the following:
. . .
5. The offender’s violation of any probation conditions, including technical violations;
. . .
8. The offender’s successful completion of the probation term.
Id.
(emphases added). In addition, the protocol for transferring probation supervision discusses the procedures for addressing probation violations in intrastate transfer cases:
B. If the offender is alleged to have committed a violation of probation while under supervision in the receiving county, and if such violation is not resolved by administrative sanction:
. . .
2. The receiving court shall notify the sentencing court of the probation violation allegations.
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Even though we do not know whether Madison County also transferred sanctioning authority to Tippecanoe County, at the very least Tippecanoe County had supervisory authority over Clark’s probation, and because of the snafu, this supervisory authority extended until November 29, 2010, or Tippecanoe County sent the case back to Madison County. Supervisory authority includes the duty to notify the sentencing court of “[t]he offender’s violation of any probation conditions, including technical violations” as well as “[t]he offender’s successful completion of the probation term.” Thus, Tippecanoe County should have notified Madison County of Clark’s alleged probation violations as a result of his commission of new offenses as well as when it (erroneously) terminated Clark’s probation on September 27, 2007.
These issues aside, there is no question that Tippecanoe County, the county with supervisory authority over Clark’s probation, knew about Clark’s new offenses because they all occurred in Tippecanoe County and resulted in charges being filed against him in Tippecanoe County (even though charges in two of the seven cause numbers were eventually dismissed) and a sentence of one year in prison and two years of supervised probation in Tippecanoe County for three of the more recent cause numbers. It is true that Madison County, the sentencing court, did not have notice that Clark committed these offenses. But Tippecanoe County had notice. And notice to the receiving court – Tippecanoe County – is notice to the sentencing court – Madison County. In other words, because the receiving court had notice of Clark’s violation, “the State” had notice within the meaning of Section 35-38-2-3(a). Imputing notice from the receiving court to the sentencing court is in line with the purpose of Section 35-38-2-3(a), which is to encourage the prompt presentation of claims. Sharp v. State, 807 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Having determined that the State had notice of the violation, we now address whether Madison County timely filed the notice of probation violation against Clark. Because Murphy, Clark’s Madison County probation officer, filed the notice on February 7, 2011, it was clearly within one year of Clark’s November 29, 2010, probation end date according to subsection (a)(2)(A). However, the notice must have been filed within forty-five days of the State receiving notice under subsection (a)(2)(B) if that occurred before the one-year limitation passed. See id. at 767. Murphy alleged in the notice that Clark committed numerous offenses ranging from April 4, 2007, to April 12, 2010. Because violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation, see Richardson v. State, 890 N.E.2d 766, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh’g denied, we will give the State the benefit of the doubt and calculate the forty-five days based on Clark’s most recent offense. That is, Clark resisted law enforcement (3g) on April 12, 2010, which resulted in the State filing a charge against him later that same month. [Footnote omitted.] So, even assuming that the State charged Clark with resisting law enforcement on the last day of the month, April 30, 2010, the February 7, 2011, notice of probation violation was not within forty-five days of that date. Because the State knew of the violation but did not file the notice of probation violation within forty-five days of receiving notice, we find that the notice of probation violation is untimely. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Clark’s motion to dismiss the notice. We therefore reverse the trial court.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.