FRIEDLANDER, J.
- Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in failing to advise Trujillo with respect to the possibility of deportation in the event he pleaded guilty?
. . . .
In Segura, our Supreme Court held that in order to state a claim for post-conviction relief under this subcategory, a petitioner may not simply allege that a plea would not have been entered, nor is the petitioner’s conclusory testimony to that effect sufficient to prove prejudice. Instead, the petitioner must “establish, by objective facts, circumstances that support the conclusion that [trial] counsel’s errors in advice as to penal consequences were material to the decision to plead.” Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d at 507. In so doing, the petitioner “must establish an objective reasonable probability that competent representation would have caused the petitioner not to enter a plea.” Id. Under this analysis, we focus upon whether the petitioner proffered specific facts indicating that a reasonable defendant would have rejected the petitioner’s plea had the petitioner’s trial counsel performed adequately. See Willoughby v. State, 792 N.E.2d 560. Finally, we note that our Supreme Court determined in Segura that the failure to advise a client of the possibility of deportation in the event of a conviction may, under certain circumstances, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. [Footnote omitted.]
Citing Sial v. State, 862 N.E.2d 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), Trujillo contends that the requisite “special circumstance” in his case is the fact that most of his family lives in the United States, and for that reason his deportation would be especially difficult for him and them. In Sial, a resident non-citizen of the United States pleaded guilty to theft as a class D felony. Sial’s attorney did not advise him of the possibility of deportation as a result of the conviction. He filed a PCR petition seeking to set aside the conviction on the basis that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to advise him of the possibility of deportation if he was convicted of a felony. The PCR court denied his petition and Sial appealed. This court reversed, applying the Segura requirement that a successful petitioner must, in order to “state a claim of prejudice from counsel’s omission or misdescription of penal consequences that attaches to both a plea and a conviction at trial, … allege … “‘special circumstance,’ or … “‘objective facts’ “supporting the conclusion that the decision to plead was driven by the erroneous advice.” Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d at 507 (footnotes containing internal citations omitted). The “special circumstances” that moved the court to grant Sial’s PCR petition was the fact that he had a wife and daughter living in the United States. [Footnote omitted.] The court explained it thus:
Here, Sial testified that he has a wife and a thirteen-year-old daughter. Inasmuch as Sial has been in the United States for over twenty years, we infer that his daughter was likely born here and, consequently, would be an American citizen. If deported, Sial would be forced either to leave his wife and child behind or to uproot them from this country—most likely the only home his daughter has ever known. We believe that these are sufficient special circumstances and specific facts to establish a reasonable probability that if Sial’s attorney had advised him that deportation is a possible consequence of a felony conviction, Sial would have chosen to proceed to trial rather than to plead guilty.
Sial v. State, 862 N.E.2d at 706 (internal citation omitted).
Trujillo contends that his special circumstances are the same as those that prompted this court to reverse the denial of Sial’s PCR petition, i.e., “Next, Trujillo does in fact have similar special facts and circumstances, as in Sial, not the least of which is long-standing presence in the United States and his roots to this country through his family.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. As recounted above, the evidence in Sial demonstrated that Sial had a wife and thirteen-year-old child living in the United States.
Beginning with the latter claim, on the facts of this case and as expanded upon below, we do not find the length of time that Trujillo has lived in the Unites States to be a special circumstance within the meaning of Segura. As to the former claim, we cannot accept Trujillo’s argument that the presence of his family in this country is the equivalent of the special circumstance deemed dispositive in Sial. We know that the Sial petitioner had a wife and minor child in the United States. In the context of this issue, a spouse and minor child surely are the most compelling of family members to consider, in that possible deportation raises the possibility of rending apart members of a nuclear family. Trujillo, however, provides scant information about what members of his family live in South Bend. The only information we can find was provided during a post-conviction, telephonic hearing conducted after Trujillo had been deported to Mexico, viz.:
Q Mr. Trujillo, you had indicated that you are now in Mexico, is that right?
A That’s correct, yes, sir.
Q And where does the majority of your family live?
A The majority of my family most everybody there except me here. I am the only one here in Mexico now. All them live up there now, are up there now.
Q Up where?
A South Bend, Indiana.
Q When you were in South Bend, Indiana, where do you reside? With whom?
A With my family, with my mother.
Appellant’s Appendix at 34.
At the time of the post-conviction hearing, Trujillo was approximately 52 years of age. As of that time, he lived with his mother and did not mention a spouse or children, much less minor children, and thus failed to establish that he had a spouse or children. The prospect of forcibly separating from one’s nuclear family that includes minor children is the sort of compelling circumstance that might indeed motivate one to forego whatever advantages may attach to pleading guilty, and instead to face whatever hazards attend a trial on the merits.
The prospect of a middle-aged man separating from his mother and relatives other than a spouse or children are not nearly so compelling. Therefore, Trujillo’s family situation is fundamentally different from the petitioner’s in Sial and is not a “special circumstance” within the meaning of Segura.
DARDEN, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.