CRONE, J.
Case Summary
Personal Finance gave Jim Norris a loan. Norris failed to make payments on the loan, and Personal Finance filed a notice of claim against Norris in small claims court. A copy of the notice of claim was delivered by the sheriff to Norris’s parents’ address, and another copy was sent to that address by first-class mail. Norris failed to appear at the hearing on Personal Finance’s claim, and the trial court entered default judgment against him. Norris filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that service of process was inadequate, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him, and the default judgment was void. Following a hearing on Norris’s motion, the trial court found that service to Norris’s parents’ address was adequate because Norris’s parents had a duty under Indiana Trial Rule 4.16 to inform the court that Norris did not live with them. The trial court denied Norris’s motion for relief from judgment.
Norris appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in applying Trial Rule 4.16 in this situation. We agree, and therefore reverse the trial court’s decision denying Norris relief.
….
Norris asserts that the trial court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over him because service to his parents’ home was inadequate under the Indiana Trial Rules. “Personal jurisdiction is the court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process and render a valid judgment over a person.” Keesling v. Winstead, 858 N.E.2d 996, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). Without effective service of process, a trial court does not obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Goodson v. Carlson, 888 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “The existence of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is … a constitutional requirement to rendering a valid judgment, mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Once the party contesting jurisdiction, usually the defendant, challenges the lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present evidence of a court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant, but “the defendant ultimately bears the burden of proving the lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, unless that lack is apparent on the face of the complaint.” LePore v. Norwest Bank Indiana, N.A., 860 N.E.2d 632, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Indiana Trial Rule 4.1 governs service to an individual and provides as follows:
Service may be made upon an individual, or an individual acting in a representative capacity, by:
(1) sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail or other public means by which a written acknowledgment of receipt may be requested and obtained to his residence, place of business or employment with return receipt requested and returned showing receipt of the letter; or
(2) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally; or
(3) leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at his dwelling house or usual place of abode; or
(4) serving his agent as provided by rule, statute or valid agreement.
(Emphasis added.) [Footnote omitted.]
Norris asserts that the record is devoid of evidence that his parents’ address was his “dwelling house or usual place of abode” in March and April of 2010 when service was attempted. In fact, the trial court did not find that the Middletown address was Norris’s dwelling house or usual place of abode.4 [FN 4: We observe that the question whether an address is a party’s dwelling place or usual place of abode is extremely fact-sensitive. See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“What is or is not a party’s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.”); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant’s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that service to defendant’s mother’s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother’s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, “Service upon a defendant’s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.”), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind. App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant’s dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant’s father’s address was defendant’s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father’s address, listed father’s address on accident report, defendant’s insurance company maintained defendant’s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant’s driver’s license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996).] Rather, the trial court orally found at the hearing that service to Norris was adequate pursuant to Trial Rule 4.16, which reads,
(A) It shall be the duty of every person being served under these rules to cooperate, accept service, comply with the provisions of these rules, and, when service is made upon him personally, acknowledge receipt of the papers in writing over his signature.
(1) Offering or tendering the papers to the person being served and advising the person that he or she is being served is adequate service.
(2) A person who has refused to accept the offer or tender of the papers being served thereafter may not challenge the service of those papers.
(B) Anyone accepting service for another person is under a duty to:
(1) promptly deliver the papers to that person;
(2) promptly notify that person that he holds the papers for him; or
(3) within a reasonable time, in writing, notify the clerk or person making the service that he has been unable to make such delivery of notice when such is the case.
(Emphases added.)
The trial court concluded that Trial Rule 4.16 applied to Norris’s parents and imposed a duty on them to inform the clerk or sheriff that Norris did not live with them. Tr. at 46. Norris argues that Trial Rule 4.16 applies only to those with authority to accept service for another person and that his parents did not have such authority. We agree based on our supreme court’s decision in LaPalme v. Romero, 621 N.E.2d 1102 (Ind. 1993), which is dispositive of this issue.
In LaPalme, Juan Romero was injured when the car he was driving was struck by a truck driven by Andre LaPalme. The Romeros filed suit against LaPalme and his employer, Danaca Transport LTEE. Both LaPalme and Danaca were served via delivery to the manager of Danaca’s legal department. LaPalme did not make an appearance in the case, and the trial court entered default judgment against him. LaPalme filed a motion to set aside judgment. The trial court concluded that he had been duly served and denied the motion.
LaPalme appealed, arguing that service of process upon him was inadequate. Our supreme court agreed, and in so doing presented the following relevant analysis:
The Romeros argue that Danaca was under a duty to inform LaPalme of the lawsuit. This argument assumes that Danaca possessed the legal authority to accept service of process for LaPalme. As concluded above, Danaca had no such authority. We construe the clause in T.R. 4.16(B) that states, “Anyone accepting service for another person …” to mean anyone with authority to accept service for another person. Indeed, the rules impose the duty of cooperation upon “every person being served under these rules.” T.R. 4.16(A) (our emphasis). The trial rules list those persons having the authority to accept service, such as the individual’s agent, T.R. 4.1(A)(3) [now 4.1(A)(4)]; the Secretary of State, T.R. 4.10; an infant’s next friend or guardian ad litem, T.R. 4.2; or with institutionalized individuals, the official in charge of the institution, T.R. 4.3. The employer is not on the list.
Id. at 1106.
In the case at bar, the sheriff delivered a copy of the notice of claim to Norris’s parents’ address. Parents of competent adults are not included in the list of persons having authority to accept service under our trial rules. Further, Personal Finance did not introduce any evidence to show that Norris’s parents were acting as his agents. In fact, Percy testified to the contrary. Tr. at 36. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that Trial Rule 4.16 applied to Norris’s parents. Service by delivery to Norris’s parents’ address was not in compliance with Trial Rule 4.1 and thus was ineffective.
As a final matter, we observe that the trial court found that Norris had actual notice of the hearing, apparently based upon the emails showing that Norris called Personal Finance’s attorney the day before the hearing. Norris asserts that “’the mere fact that the defendant has knowledge of the action will not grant the court personal jurisdiction.’” Appellant’s Br. at 10 (quoting Hill v. Ramey, 744 N.E.2d 509, 512-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). In Hill, service was attempted by placing a copy of the summons and temporary protective order against defendant Hill in the door of the house where his parents lived. A hearing on the protective order was held at which Hill did not appear, and the trial court issued a permanent protective order. Hill filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(6), alleging that service was inadequate and the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court found that the petitioner believed that Hill was still living with his parents and did not know that he had moved. The trial court further found that Hill received the notice sent by certified mail to his parents, and denied Hill’s motion for relief. Hill appealed, and as in the instant case, the appellee did not file an answer brief. The Hill court held that service by delivery to Hill’s parents’ home was inadequate, even if Hill eventually received the summons and motion for protective order that the sheriff later mailed to him at his parents’ address. Id. The Hill court therefore reversed the trial court’s denial of Hill’s motion for relief from judgment.
We reiterate that because Personal Finance did not file an appellee’s brief, Norris is required to present only a prima facie case that the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief from judgment. [Footnote omitted.] Given the standard of review in this case, we conclude that Norris has met his burden to show that the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
Reversed.
BAILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.