MAY, J.
D.E. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent. He asserts the trial court improperly accepted the plea agreement that was not signed by either of his parents. . . . .
. . . .
Indiana law establishes a strict standard for when a juvenile’s rights may be waived:
Any rights guaranteed to the child under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only:
(1) by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child, if the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver;
(2) by the child’s custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem if:
(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right;
(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;
(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child; and
(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver.
Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1.
D.E. and his counsel signed the plea agreement. D.E. concedes those signatures satisfy the requirements of the statute, but argues his parents’ “rights were thwarted by the provisions of Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1, which allowed appointed counsel to waive D.E.’s right to a fact-finding adjudication.” (Br. of Appellant at 10.) We cannot agree.
D.E.’s mother was present at every hearing, and his father attended the hearing during which D.E. accepted the plea agreement. Both parents indicated they understood the implications of the waivers in the plea agreement. D.E.’s mother did not approve of the way the State treated D.E. differently than J.S., so she would not sign the plea agreement; however, she never denied D.E.’s guilt or indicated she disagreed with his acceptance of the plea agreement.
D.E. also argues he was denied the “opportunity for meaningful consultation with his parents prior to signing the plea agreement in this case.” (Id. at 12) (emphasis in original). He was not. The plea agreement was presented to D.E. on February 7, 2011, and he requested a continuance to consider it. The trial court continued the dispositional hearing until February 9. At the dispositional hearing, neither D.E. nor his parents claimed they had not had an opportunity to discuss the agreement. [Footnote omitted.]
D.E. has not demonstrated the waivers in his plea agreement did not comport with Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1. It is undisputed that D.E. and his counsel signed the plea agreement, which is sufficient to satisfy the statute. D.E. has not alleged he involuntarily or unknowingly entered into the agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s acceptance of D.E.’s plea agreement. [Footnote omitted.]
RILEY, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.