BAKER, J.
Appellant-defendant David R. Camm appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for the appointment of a special prosecutor pursuant to Indiana Code Section 33-39-1-6(b)(2). More particularly, Camm argues that the trial court erred when it found that the prosecutor’s now cancelled literary contract did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of an actual conflict of interest. Camm further contends that the trial court erred when it required that he show harm in order to prove an actual conflict of interest. Concluding that prosecutor’s literary contract created an irreversible, actual conflict of interest with his duty to the people of the state of Indiana, we find that the trial court erred when it denied Camm’s petition. Thus, we reverse and remand for the appointment of special prosecutor and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Our decision today does not rest solely on whether or not there was a contract in place. Henderson has established a personal agenda to both write this book and ensure that Camm is prosecuted. Henderson’s own words are evidence of that agenda. In his email to his literary agent following reversal, Henderson stated: “I am committed to writing the book as is Damon. A tremendous amount of work has been done to this point. It’s a great story that needs to be told. . . . In addition, as you and Damon have discussed, this is now a bigger story.” Appellant’s Ex. F at G. And, in a statement to the media, Henderson wrote that he was “more convinced now than ever that when this matter is completed, the unedited version of events needs to be told.” Appellant’s Ex. J at K.
As prosecutor, Henderson should not have a personal interest in this case separate from his professional role as prosecutor. In other words, Henderson cannot be both committed to writing a book about the Camm case and serve as prosecutor. Such a personal interest creates an actual conflict of interest with his duties as prosecutor.
In light of the facts of this case, Camm has shown clear and convincing evidence of an actual conflict of interest. By entering into a literary contract based in substantial part on information relating to a case in fieri, the prosecutor has created a personal interest that is in conflict with his duties as the People’s representative. This conflict has and will undercut his ability to represent their interest in a just and fair trial due to issues created by him that did previously not exist. Cancellation of the contract does little to obviate Henderson’s personal interest; and “[t]he public trust in the integrity of the judicial process requires us to resolve any serious doubt in favor of disqualification.” Jones v. State, 901 N.E.2d 655, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Thus, we find that the trial court erred in denying Camm’s petition for a special prosecutor.
NAJAM, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.