FRIEDLANDER, J.
To prove that Garrett committed class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Garrett knowingly or intentionally forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered with a law enforcement officer while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties. I.C. § 35-44-3-3(a)(1).
Garrett claims that the evidence cannot support her conviction because she had a right to reasonably resist Officer Rauch’s efforts to place her in handcuffs because Officer Rauch and the other responding officers entered her home without a warrant and without any other justifiable reason to enter her home. Garrett takes issue with our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Barnes v. State, wherein the Court held “there is no right to reasonably resist unlawful entry by police officers.” 946 N.E.2d at 574. Garrett also argues that the Barnes holding should not be applied retroactively to her case.
Here, Officer Rauch was responding to a report of a domestic disturbance. Upon arrival at the scene, Officer Rauch observed Garrett, who had been identified as one of the parties involved in the domestic dispute, and noted that she was visibly angry and was walking quickly toward the house from where the disturbance call originated, muttering under her breath. Officer Rauch ordered Garrett not to go inside the house and she responded, saying, “fuck that, I’m beating that motherfucker’s ass.” Transcript at 9. Garrett then proceeded to enter the home and Officer Rauch followed, stopping outside the door Garrett had entered.
Initially, Officer Rauch remained outside as he tried to determine what was happening and to diffuse the situation. Officer Rauch could see Garrett inside the home, and at one point, tried to grab her by the wrist to get her to come outside and talk to him. Garrett pulled away from Officer Rauch’s grasp and retreated farther into the house. Others inside the home were standing between Garrett and the rest of the house. This confirmed Officer Rauch’s belief that Garrett wanted to fight someone else in the house. Garrett kept refusing to comply with Officer Rauch’s orders to come outside and the entire time Garrett remained loud and belligerent. It was at this point that Officer Rauch entered the house as part of his continued effort to determine what was going on and to diffuse the situation.
When Officer Rauch entered the home and confronted Garrett in the living room, which was about the same time that the back-up officers arrived, Garrett was yelling for the officers to “go get that motherfucker, he’s in the bathroom. Why are you talking to me? Go get him. Go get him.” Id. at 15-16. At this point, even though she had not previously invited the officers into the home, she clearly acquiesced in the presence of the officers in her home and, indeed, invited the officers into her home when she directed them to detain an individual she believed was in the bathroom.
Garrett’s conviction for resisting law enforcement was based on events that transpired after she expressly directed the officers to look and detain someone she believed to be in the bathroom. As the two back-up officers were checking out the bathroom, Officer Rauch told Garrett that he was going to place her in handcuffs because she was still very agitated and yelling and screaming. Garrett resisted Officer Garrett’s attempt to detain her and a struggle ensued, which ultimately involved a second officer. Garrett’s claim that her resistance at this point was reasonable in response to an unlawful entry by the officers is untenable as the entry of the officers and Garrett’s resistance are completely divorced from one another. Garrett’s resistance occurred after she had acquiesced to their presence in her home. Garrett’s
argument that the officers were unlawfully in her home is without merit.
Moreover, we note that in its opinion on rehearing, our Supreme Court reiterated the notion submitted by the Attorney General in response to Barnes’s petition for rehearing that “reasonable resistance does not include battery or other violent acts against law enforcement.” Barnes v. State, slip op. at 3. Here, the trial court concluded from the evidence that the officers “were attempting to diffuse the situation and it was simply made worse by Miss Garrett.” Transcript at 50-51. We agree with the trial court’s assessment. Instead of cooperating with Officer Rauch, Garrett forcefully pushed him away and then struggled with him, during which she kneed him in the upper thigh. It took a second officer joining in the scuffle to get Garrett in handcuffs. Thus, even if this were a situation involving unlawful police entry, Garrett’s resistance was not reasonable.
Given that Garrett has failed to establish an unlawful entry and our conclusion that her resistance was not reasonable, the rule announced in Barnes is not applicable to the present case. Notwithstanding, the Barnes decision does not present an ex post facto problem in this case. It has long been established that battery against a police officer is not reasonable resistance under the common law. See Barnes v. State, 946 N.E.2d 572; Robinson v. State, 814 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Thus, even prior to Barnes, Garrett’s conduct in forcefully combating the officer(s) after she acquiesced in their presence in her home was unlawful. The evidence presented was sufficient to prove that Garrett knowingly or intentionally forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered with a law enforcement officer while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties.
DARDEN, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.