BRADFORD, J.
On September 18, 2009, the State charged that on September 11, 2009, Allen committed Class B misdemeanor visiting a common nuisance under cause number 15D02-0909-CM-407 (hereinafter “Cause No. CM-407”) in Dearborn Superior Court II. On August 27, 2010, Allen and the State entered in to a plea agreement in Cause No. CM-407. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, Allen pled guilty to Class B misdemeanor visiting a common nuisance, and the State agreed that Allen would be sentenced to 180 days, all of which would be suspended to probation. The Dearborn Superior Court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Allen accordingly on August 27, 2010.
Meanwhile, during a deposition on an unrelated matter on April 26, 2010, Haenny indicated that Allen had sold Patterson the heroin on which she and Patterson had overdosed on September 11, 2009. As a result of Haenny’s statements, on May 13, 2010, while Cause No. CM-407 was pending, the State charged that Allen, also on September 11, 2009, committed Class A felony dealing in heroin within 1000 feet of a public park under cause number 15C01-1005-FA-2 (hereinafter “Cause No. FA-2”) in Dearborn Circuit Court.
Allen filed a motion to dismiss Cause No. FA-2 on August 31, 2010, after he pled guilty and had been sentenced in Cause No. CM-407. Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss on September 13, 2010, the trial court denied Allen’s motion. Thereafter, the trial court granted Allen’s motion for an interlocutory appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction over the appeal on March 4, 2011.
. . .
The Successive Prosecution Statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) A prosecution is barred if all of the following exist:
(1) There was a former prosecution of the defendant for a different offense or for the same offense based on different facts.
(2) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction of the defendant or in an improper termination under section 3 of this chapter.
(3) The instant prosecution is for an offense with which the defendant should have been charged in the former prosecution.
Ind. Code § 35-41-4-4 (2009). It is undisputed that the circumstances here satisfy the provisions of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). Thus, the outcome of this case centers on whether the instant prosecution is for offenses with which Allen “should have been charged” in the previous prosecution. See Williams v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2002).
The Indiana Supreme Court has held that the words “should have been charged” must be read in conjunction with Indiana’s joinder statute. Id. Indiana’s joinder statute provides in relevant part:
Two (2) or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment or information, with each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses:
(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or
(2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.
Ind. Code § 35–34–1–9(a) (2009). Further, Indiana Code Section 35–34–1–10 (2009) provides in relevant part:
A defendant who has been tried for one (1) offense may thereafter move to dismiss an indictment or information for an offense which could have been joined for trial with the prior offenses under section 9 of this chapter. The motion to dismiss shall be made prior to the second trial, and shall be granted if the prosecution is barred by reason of the former prosecution.
Ind. Code § 35–34–1–10(c). Thus, in general, “’where two or more charges are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, they should be joined for trial.’” Williams, 762 N.E.2d at 1220 (quoting State v. Wiggins, 661 N.E.2d 878, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). In determining whether contemporaneous crimes are part of a single scheme or plan, we examine “’whether they are connected by a distinctive nature, have a common modus operandi, and a common motive.’” Id. (quoting Henderson v. State, 647 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)).
. . . .
. . . [W]e similarly must conclude here that Allen’s charges were based on a series of acts so connected that they constituted parts of a single plan. Upon review, the record demonstrates that Allen knew that Patterson and Haenny frequently used heroin when he visited their apartment on September 11, 2009. In a deposition for an unrelated matter, Haenny stated that prior to September 11, 2009, Allen routinely helped her purchase heroin by driving her to Cincinnati to buy heroin and that, in exchange, she would give him gas money and “some of the dope.” Appellant’s App. p. 89. Haenny also revealed that Allen knew that Patterson got paid on Fridays and that he often bought drugs after getting paid. The record further demonstrates that Allen took heroin with him to Patterson’s and Haenny’s apartment on Friday, September 11, 2009; that he offered to sell the heroin to Patterson; and that Patterson bought the heroin from Allen.
Based on these facts, we conclude that it is reasonable to assume that Allen went to Patterson’s and Haenny’s apartment on September 11, 2009, with the intention to sell heroin to Patterson and Haenny. Thus, we conclude that Allen’s actions involving Patterson and Haenny on September 11, 2009, constituted parts of a single plan to sell heroin, and therefore should have been charged in a single prosecution. As such, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Allen’s motion to dismiss. [Footnote omitted.]
ROBB, C.J., and BARNES, J., concur.