May, J.
K.S. appeals an order granting K.S.’s ex-boyfriend, B.W., visitation with her daughter, M.M. K.S. alleges the court erred by granting visitation and abused its discretion by denying her request for attorney’s fees. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
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K.S. does not contest any findings of fact. Instead she argues the trial court’s decision was contrary to law. We agree.
Indiana law defines a “de facto custodian” as someone
who has been the primary caregiver for, and financial support of, a child who has resided with the person for at least
(1) six (6) months if the child is less than three (3) years of age; or
(2) one (1) year if the child is at least three (3) years of age.
Ind. Code § 31-9-2-35.5. Our legislature specifically provided the definition of de facto custodian applies only to custody proceedings following the determination of paternity (Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.5), actions for child custody or modification of child custody orders (Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8.5), and temporary placement of a child in need of services who is taken into custody (Ind. Code § 31-34-4-2).
Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that status as a de facto custodian
bears only on the question of custody. See Indiana Code § 31–14–13–2.5(b)(2) (providing in relevant part “In addition to the factors listed in section 2 of this chapter, the court shall consider the following factors in determining custody: . . . The extent to which the child has been cared for, nurtured, and supported by the de facto custodian.”) (emphasis added). The apparent intent of the de facto custodian statute is to clarify that a third party may have standing in certain custody proceedings, and that it may be in a child’s best interests to be placed in that party’s custody. In re Guardianship of L.L., 745 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The statute is silent on the question of visitation.
K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 461-62 (Ind. 2009). [Footnote omitted.] Based thereon, the Court held the de facto custodian statute did not give a trial court authority to grant visitation to a grandmother who had guardianship over a child from the age of six months.
Neither, held the Court, could the grandmother obtain visitation “pursuant to the non-custodial parent’s visitation provided under the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.” Id. at 461. The Court explained why an order of visitation under the Indiana Parenting Guidelines would be inappropriate:
It is true that the Guidelines acknowledge a child’s basic need “[t]o develop and maintain meaningful relationships with other significant adults (grandparents, stepparents and other relatives) as long as these relationships do not interfere with or replace the child’s primary relationship with the parents.” Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines, A Child’s Basic Needs (8). However, as the Court of Appeals has observed, “The guideline’s title — Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines — indicates that they apply to parents, not other family members. More to the point: ‘The Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines are based on the premise that it is usually in a child’s best interest to have frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with each parent.’
Id. (emphasis in original).
We must accordingly reverse the grant of visitation to B.W. because B.W. is not M.M.’s father. While he was an important part of M.M.’s life at one time, Indiana law does not provide for an order of visitation under this circumstance.
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CONCLUSION
Because Indiana law does not provide for a grant of visitation in this circumstance, we reverse that order. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of K.S.’s request for attorney’s fees.
Reversed in part, and affirmed in part.
RILEY, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.