Crone, J.
….
Discussion and Decision
Goldberg contends that the trial court’s order should be reversed because the court lacked jurisdiction to certify the settlement class while the issue of class certification was pending on appeal. [Footnote omitted.] Goldberg also contends that the order should be reversed because “Farno did not provide the trial court with any additional evidence to support certification of the same class for the purposes of settlement.” Appellants’ Br. at 9.
In her appellee’s brief, Farno renews the argument that she made in her motion to dismiss Goldberg’s appeal and in her opposition to Goldberg’s motion to accept jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal; namely, that Goldberg cannot challenge the trial court’s order “because it does not damage, prejudice, or affect his legal rights in any way.” Farno’s Br. at 17. She quotes a federal case for the proposition that “[i]n class actions, ‘[t]he general rule, of course, is that a non-settling party does not have standing to object to a settlement between other parties.’” Id. (quoting Agretti v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 982 F.2d 242, 246 (7th Cir. 1992)). Both the Seventh Circuit and other circuits have adopted the doctrine that a defendant must “prove plain legal prejudice in order to have standing to challenge a partial settlement to which it is not a party.” Agretti, 982 F.2d at 246 (citing, inter alia, Quad/Graphics, 724 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1983), and cases from the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits).
In Quad/Graphics, the court explained that the “plain legal prejudice” standard
implements the policy consideration of encouraging the voluntary resolution of lawsuits and maintains consistency in the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) regarding voluntary dismissals.[Footnote omitted.] Under that rule a defendant must demonstrate plain legal prejudice in order to prevent a voluntary dismissal of the claim against him by a plaintiff. In applying this standard [other courts] have determined that a showing of injury in fact, such as the prospect of a second lawsuit or the creation of a tactical advantage, is insufficient to justify denying the plaintiff‟s motion to dismiss. In the context of a partial settlement, Rule 41(a)(2) is usually the mechanism by which the settling defendants are eliminated from the case. It would indeed be incongruous for a non-settling defendant to have any less of a burden in attempting to prevent such a voluntary dismissal than he would if he were the party being dismissed.
724 F.2d at 1233 (footnote and citations omitted). In Agretti, the court further explained that “[t]he doctrine of plain legal prejudice does not depend upon whether the settlement involves a class action or simply ordinary litigation.” 982 F.2d at 247. “Mere allegations of injury in fact or tactical disadvantage as a result of a settlement simply do not rise to the level of plain legal prejudice.” Id. Rather, a non-settling party must show that the settlement interfered with its contract rights or its “ability to seek contribution or indemnification,” or that the settlement stripped “the party of a legal claim or cause of action, such as a cross-claim or the right to present relevant evidence at trial.” Id.
When an Indiana Trial Rule is based on a corresponding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, it is appropriate for our courts to look at federal court interpretations when applying the Indiana rule. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Gresh, 888 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Given that the “plain legal prejudice” standard is based on Federal Rule 41(a)(2), which is substantially similar to Indiana Trial Rule 41(A)(2), and that “Indiana strongly favors settlement agreements,” Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. 2003), we hereby adopt that standard for determining whether a non-settling defendant, such as Goldberg, has standing to challenge a partial settlement to which it is not a party, whether in “a class action or simply ordinary litigation.” Agretti, 982 F.2d at 247. We agree with Farno that Goldberg has failed to establish plain legal prejudice in this case. It is undisputed that the class settlement did not interfere with Goldberg‟s contractual rights or his “ability to seek contribution or indemnification,” nor did it strip him of “a legal claim or cause of action.” Id.
In his reply brief, Goldberg complains that the attorney’s fees to be paid to Farno’s counsel pursuant to the settlement will reduce the amount of money received by the trusts, which “represents an increase in the amount of potential damages that may be claimed against [him].” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 8. He further asserts that the costs associated with notice to the class regarding the settlement “will necessarily increase the amount of potential damages that may be claimed against [him],” as will any notification costs incurred if the litigation class is later certified. Id. Finally, he contends that “[w]hatever additional cooperation the Settlement Agreement requires beyond the signatories‟ obligations under the Indiana Trial Rules operates to prejudice [him] and cause him immediate danger of sustaining direct injury.” Id. at 8-9 (citation and quotation marks omitted). At most, the potential injuries claimed by Goldberg are merely injuries in fact or tactical disadvantages, which do not constitute plain legal prejudice. Agretti, 982 F.2d at 247. As such, Goldberg has no standing to challenge the trial court’s ruling. Therefore, we affirm.
Affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.