ROBB, C.J.
In December of 2000, Lucas, who was originally charged with rape as a Class B felony, pleaded guilty to sexual battery as a Class D felony. . . . Pursuant to then-existing Indiana law, he was also required to register as a sex offender for his entire lifetime. In August of 2001, Lucas’s sentence was modified; he was removed from home detention and placed on probation. . . . .
In 2007, Indiana Code section 11-8-8-19, which provides registration requirements for sex offenders, was amended to exclude offenders convicted of sexual battery as a Class D felony from a subsection otherwise requiring lifetime registration. . . . Pursuant to this exception, offenders convicted of sexual battery as a Class D felony are now only required to register for a period of ten years.
Noting the amendment to section 11-8-8-19, Lucas filed a Verified Petition for Relief from the lifetime registration requirement pursuant to Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22, which was added to the chapter during the 2007 legislative session to accompany the various changes throughout the chapter. Lucas’s petition set forth all the necessary elements for a successful petition pursuant to the above statute, as well as the following facts: Lucas had not been arrested for any sex offense, had not failed to register subsequent to his sexual offense, had no other criminal record, and was well over seventy years old. A hearing was held regarding Lucas’s petition, at which the State called J.M. as a witness. She stated her opposition to Lucas’s petition and her belief that even if Lucas’s continued registration would not benefit her, it may protect others. She also testified part of the reason she agreed with the State’s plea agreement with Lucas was that she understood he would be required to register as a sex offender for his entire life. The trial court denied Lucas’s petition on September 20, 2010, without issuing findings of fact or conclusions of law, stating in its order that “the Court now, pursuant to I.C. 11-8-8-22(g)(3), denies [Lucas’s] Petition . . . .” Appellant’s Appendix at 4. Lucas now appeals the trial court’s denial of his Verified Petition for Relief. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
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Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22(g) expressly provides the trial court “has the discretion to deny a petition under this section, even if the court makes the findings under [subsection (g)].” Lucas repeatedly rests his argument on the fact that he is eligible for relief under the relevant statute because he proved the requisite findings, along with the facts that he has no other criminal record, has complied with registration requirements, and has not bothered the victim since his offense. For us to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion because Lucas meets all the required findings for relief would be to ignore subsection (g)’s express discretionary language that applies even when a petitioner has shown all necessary findings. Although Lucas presented evidence to support his petition for relief in addition to evidence showing the necessary findings in the statutory section, the State also presented evidence while arguing for denial of the petition, including the victim’s previous reliance upon Lucas’s lifetime registration requirement when agreeing with the prosecution to offer him a plea agreement that would convict him of a lesser crime and the victim’s belief that his continued registration may protect others. Lucas has not met his burden of proving the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of all the facts and circumstances.
BARNES, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.