BARNES, J.
The sole restated issue we address is whether the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), applies retroactively to Henderson’s case to require suppression of evidence found in his vehicle.
. . . .
On direct appeal, Henderson argued that the search of his vehicle violated both the United States and Indiana Constitutions. In resolving the federal Fourth Amendment question, this court held that the search was a valid vehicle search incident to arrest, pursuant to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). [Footnote omitted.] We relied upon the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of Belton, which was that the fact a defendant “may have been removed from the vehicle—or from the scene altogether—does not negate the officer’s authority to search the car’s interior.” Henderson, slip op. at 4-5 (citing Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 957 (Ind. 1992), cert. denied). We also held that the search was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution, and thus affirmed Henderson‘s convictions. Our supreme court denied transfer in August 2008. Henderson did not file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
In April 2009, the Supreme Court decided Gant. There, four justices stated, “Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. at 1723. Justice Scalia concurred, but stated that he would prefer a rule allowing a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest “only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred.” Id., 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring).
On October 21, 2009, Henderson filed a pro se PCR petition, which was later amended by counsel. The petition alleged that, pursuant to Gant, the search of Henderson’s vehicle was not a valid search incident to arrest and that Henderson should be allowed to rely upon Gant on collateral review. Henderson did not raise any Indiana Constitution issues in the PCR petition. On January 26, 2011, after conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court denied Henderson‘s petition. Henderson now appeals.
. . . .
Here, the State does not contest that, under Gant v. Arizona, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), the search of Henderson’s vehicle could not be considered a valid warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest. It also is clear that, for purposes of collateral review, Henderson’s case became final well before Gant was decided. . . . The question is whether Henderson can retroactively seek suppression of the evidence recovered from his vehicle, and hence reversal of his convictions, through a PCR petition.
Although state courts are free to establish their own collateral review retroactivity rules independent of the rules for federal courts considering habeas corpus petitions, Indiana has chosen to adopt the federal retroactivity rule established by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). Mohler, 694 N.E.2d at 1132. Under Teague, new rules of criminal procedure generally are not retroactively available on collateral review. Id. at 1133. A case announces a new rule of criminal procedure if “’it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the . . . [g]overnment . . . [or] if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final,’ . . . or if the result is ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds . . . .’” Id. at 1132-33 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S. Ct. at 1070, and Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990)). New rules of criminal procedure may apply retroactively on collateral review only if (1) the new rule places certain kinds of primary, private conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to proscribe; or (2) if the new rule requires the observance of procedures that “’are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’” or in other words, “’watershed rules of criminal procedure’” that are “’central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt.’” Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313, 109 S. Ct. at 1076, 1077).
. . . .
Ultimately, however, we find our supreme court’s approach to what constitutes a new rule of criminal procedure to be irrelevant in the context of this case. Instead, we conclude that this case is directly controlled by a decision from the Supreme Court that was issued three days after Henderson filed his opening brief in this appeal, Davis v. United States, – U.S. –, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2011). In Davis, the Court addressed the question of whether a defendant whose case was not final before Gant was decided could rely upon Gant and the Fourth Amendment‘s exclusionary rule to suppress evidence that was discovered during a search that may have violated Gant, but which was conducted before Gant was decided. The Court ruled that the defendant could not rely upon the exclusionary rule in that situation.
The Court held, unequivocally, “Because suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Davis, – U.S. –, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24. It observed that the case before it had arisen out of the Eleventh Circuit, whose courts before Gant was decided had interpreted Belton, much as Indiana’s courts did, “to establish a bright-line rule authorizing the search of a vehicle‘s passenger compartment incident to a recent occupant’s arrest.” Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2428. Law enforcement had fully complied with this precedent when searching the defendant’s vehicle. The Court also described Gant as establishing “a new, two-part rule” governing warrantless vehicle searches incident to arrest. Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2425 (emphasis added). Noting that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations and is not a personal constitutional right, and that the law enforcement officers in the case had reasonably relied upon binding precedent in conducting the search, the Court held that the defendant could not rely upon the exclusionary rule. Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2426, 2429. The Court also stated that, even though Gant in fact applied to the defendant’s case and that it may have established that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, he still was not entitled to the remedy of exclusion of the illegally-seized evidence. Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2431.
. . . .
Davis and Membres are crystal clear as a matter of Fourth Amendment law and Indiana search and seizure jurisprudence. The rule they establish is that where police conduct a search that complies with binding precedent at the time of the search, but that precedent is overruled or altered after the search occurs, a defendant may not seek suppression of the evidence based on the change in the law. This rule applies regardless of whether or not a defendant‘s case is technically “final” for purposes of retroactivity analysis.
Here, as we held in our opinion on direct appeal, the search of Henderson‘s vehicle was valid under Belton and our supreme court’s interpretation of Belton, as reflected in cases such as Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 957 (Ind. 1992), cert. denied. The officer who conducted the search cannot be said to have engaged in any kind of “wrongdoing” in conducting the search. Thus, allowing Henderson to invoke the exclusionary rule to seek suppression of the evidence, based on the new rule announced in Gant, would be inconsistent with the rule’s purpose. This would be the result, regardless of whether this case was on direct appeal or post-conviction review.
Because Henderson cannot rely upon Gant to seek suppression of evidence that was recovered during a search that predated Gant, the post-conviction court properly denied Henderson‘s PCR petition.
BARNES, J.
The sole restated issue we address is whether the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), applies retroactively to Henderson’s case to require suppression of evidence found in his vehicle.
. . . .
On direct appeal, Henderson argued that the search of his vehicle violated both the United States and Indiana Constitutions. In resolving the federal Fourth Amendment question, this court held that the search was a valid vehicle search incident to arrest, pursuant to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). [Footnote omitted.] We relied upon the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of Belton, which was that the fact a defendant “may have been removed from the vehicle—or from the scene altogether—does not negate the officer’s authority to search the car’s interior.” Henderson, slip op. at 4-5 (citing Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 957 (Ind. 1992), cert. denied). We also held that the search was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution, and thus affirmed Henderson‘s convictions. Our supreme court denied transfer in August 2008. Henderson did not file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
In April 2009, the Supreme Court decided Gant. There, four justices stated, “Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. at 1723. Justice Scalia concurred, but stated that he would prefer a rule allowing a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest “only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred.” Id., 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring).
On October 21, 2009, Henderson filed a pro se PCR petition, which was later amended by counsel. The petition alleged that, pursuant to Gant, the search of Henderson’s vehicle was not a valid search incident to arrest and that Henderson should be allowed to rely upon Gant on collateral review. Henderson did not raise any Indiana Constitution issues in the PCR petition. On January 26, 2011, after conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court denied Henderson‘s petition. Henderson now appeals.
. . . .
Here, the State does not contest that, under Gant v. Arizona, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), the search of Henderson’s vehicle could not be considered a valid warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest. It also is clear that, for purposes of collateral review, Henderson’s case became final well before Gant was decided. . . . The question is whether Henderson can retroactively seek suppression of the evidence recovered from his vehicle, and hence reversal of his convictions, through a PCR petition.
Although state courts are free to establish their own collateral review retroactivity rules independent of the rules for federal courts considering habeas corpus petitions, Indiana has chosen to adopt the federal retroactivity rule established by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). Mohler, 694 N.E.2d at 1132. Under Teague, new rules of criminal procedure generally are not retroactively available on collateral review. Id. at 1133. A case announces a new rule of criminal procedure if “’it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the . . . [g]overnment . . . [or] if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final,’ . . . or if the result is ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds . . . .’” Id. at 1132-33 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S. Ct. at 1070, and Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990)). New rules of criminal procedure may apply retroactively on collateral review only if (1) the new rule places certain kinds of primary, private conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to proscribe; or (2) if the new rule requires the observance of procedures that “’are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’” or in other words, “’watershed rules of criminal procedure’” that are “’central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt.’” Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313, 109 S. Ct. at 1076, 1077).
. . . .
Ultimately, however, we find our supreme court’s approach to what constitutes a new rule of criminal procedure to be irrelevant in the context of this case. Instead, we conclude that this case is directly controlled by a decision from the Supreme Court that was issued three days after Henderson filed his opening brief in this appeal, Davis v. United States, – U.S. –, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2011). In Davis, the Court addressed the question of whether a defendant whose case was not final before Gant was decided could rely upon Gant and the Fourth Amendment‘s exclusionary rule to suppress evidence that was discovered during a search that may have violated Gant, but which was conducted before Gant was decided. The Court ruled that the defendant could not rely upon the exclusionary rule in that situation.
The Court held, unequivocally, “Because suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Davis, – U.S. –, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24. It observed that the case before it had arisen out of the Eleventh Circuit, whose courts before Gant was decided had interpreted Belton, much as Indiana’s courts did, “to establish a bright-line rule authorizing the search of a vehicle‘s passenger compartment incident to a recent occupant’s arrest.” Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2428. Law enforcement had fully complied with this precedent when searching the defendant’s vehicle. The Court also described Gant as establishing “a new, two-part rule” governing warrantless vehicle searches incident to arrest. Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2425 (emphasis added). Noting that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations and is not a personal constitutional right, and that the law enforcement officers in the case had reasonably relied upon binding precedent in conducting the search, the Court held that the defendant could not rely upon the exclusionary rule. Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2426, 2429. The Court also stated that, even though Gant in fact applied to the defendant’s case and that it may have established that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, he still was not entitled to the remedy of exclusion of the illegally-seized evidence. Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2431.
. . . .
Davis and Membres are crystal clear as a matter of Fourth Amendment law and Indiana search and seizure jurisprudence. The rule they establish is that where police conduct a search that complies with binding precedent at the time of the search, but that precedent is overruled or altered after the search occurs, a defendant may not seek suppression of the evidence based on the change in the law. This rule applies regardless of whether or not a defendant‘s case is technically “final” for purposes of retroactivity analysis.
Here, as we held in our opinion on direct appeal, the search of Henderson‘s vehicle was valid under Belton and our supreme court’s interpretation of Belton, as reflected in cases such as Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 957 (Ind. 1992), cert. denied. The officer who conducted the search cannot be said to have engaged in any kind of “wrongdoing” in conducting the search. Thus, allowing Henderson to invoke the exclusionary rule to seek suppression of the evidence, based on the new rule announced in Gant, would be inconsistent with the rule’s purpose. This would be the result, regardless of whether this case was on direct appeal or post-conviction review.
Because Henderson cannot rely upon Gant to seek suppression of evidence that was recovered during a search that predated Gant, the post-conviction court properly denied Henderson‘s PCR petition.
ROBB, C.J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.