BARNES, J.
. . . With respect to consecutive sentencing, Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(c) provides in part:
The court may order terms of imprisonment to be served consecutively even if the sentences are not imposed at the same time. However, except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment, exclusive of terms of imprisonment under IC 35-50-2-8 and IC 35-50-2-10, to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the advisory sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted.
If the statutory limitation on consecutive sentencing applies in this case, then Coleman’s aggregate sentence cannot exceed fifty-five years, which is the advisory sentence for murder, the next class of felony above a Class A felony. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a).
Class A felony robbery is a delineated “crime of violence,” pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(a)(12); conspiracy to commit that offense or any of the delineated “crimes of violence” is not expressly listed as a “crime of violence.” Coleman contends that Class A felony conspiracy to commit robbery cannot be considered a “crime of violence” because it is not expressly listed as such in the statute. The State responds that we should nonetheless consider conspiracy to commit an offense the same as committing that offense itself, apparently conceding that Coleman’s acts of possessing a firearm as a SVF and conspiring to commit robbery constituted a single episode of criminal conduct.3 [3 Possession of a firearm by a SVF is not a “crime of violence.” Nonetheless, if Class A felony conspiracy to commit robbery is a “crime of violence,” the sentences for those two offenses could be served consecutively without limitation. See Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 737-38 (Ind. 2000).]
No Indiana case has directly addressed whether conspiracy to commit a “crime of violence” constitutes commission of a “crime of violence” for purposes of Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(c). In at least two previous cases, this court proceeded on the assumption that conspiracy to commit a “crime of violence” was not a “crime of violence,” and then analyzed whether the single episode of criminal conduct rule applied to limit a defendant’s sentence. See Fields v. State, 825 N.E.2d 841, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied; Green v. State, 850 N.E.2d 977, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), summarily aff’d in relevant part, 856 N.E.2d 703, 704-05 (Ind. 2006). Neither Fields nor Green, however, analyzed or provided any citation for whether conspiracy to commit an offense constitutes a “crime of violence.” The precise issue was neither raised nor argued in those cases. Here, the parties squarely raise the issue.
Our starting point in addressing this question is Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. 2000). There, our supreme court held that although murder is a delineated “crime of violence,” attempted murder was not. Ellis, 736 N.E.2d at 737. The court declined to extend the clear statutory delineation of what constitutes a “crime of violence” to attempts to commit such crimes. Id. It held that the statute was clear, that the legislature listed the precise names and citations of what were to be considered “crimes of violence,” and that the legislature could have written the statute to include other offenses if it had intended to do so. Id. (quoting Ballard v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). . . . .
After Ellis, the legislature amended Section 35-50-1-2(a)’s list of delineated “crimes of violence” to specifically include attempted murder. See Ind. P.L. 228-2001, § 6. It did not, however, make an attempt to commit any of the other delineated “crimes of violence” a “crime of violence.” Given this, in light of Ellis’s general holding that an attempt to commit a “crime of violence” is not the same as committing a “crime of violence,” it is reasonable to infer that the legislature considered the crime of attempted murder to warrant special treatment that attempts to commit other crimes did not. Ellis’s clear holding, we posit, is that an attempt to commit any of the other delineated “crimes of violence” besides murder, including Class A felony robbery, remains excluded from the statutory definition of a “crime of violence.”
Given Ellis, the question we must answer is whether a conviction for conspiring to commit a crime is akin to attempting to commit a crime, at least for purposes of the consecutive sentencing statute. . . . .
. . . .
Indiana law currently treats conspiracy to commit an offense as separate and distinct from commission of the offense itself. We conclude that conspiracies are akin to attempts for purposes of Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2, and the rule announced in Ellis applies. The legislature has been on clear notice for at least ten years that Indiana courts will strictly construe the meaning of “crimes of violence” under Section 35-50-1-2, and that courts will not infer that the legislature intended any unlisted offenses to qualify as such crimes. Aside from adding attempted murder to the list of enumerated offenses, it has taken no action to make conspiracies generally, or attempts to commit any crime other than murder, “crimes of violence.”
The legislature reasonably may have concluded that because conspiracies do not necessarily result in actual harm to a victim, and often require less proof of detrimental conduct in order to convict a defendant than as to the completed crime, it would not include conspiracies to commit a “crime of violence” within the definition of “crime of violence.” Of course, the particular conspiracy in this case had brutally violent, tragic results. Nonetheless, we are not authorized to create fact-specific exceptions to the plain language of Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2. Thus, we must direct that Coleman’s aggregate sentence cannot exceed fifty-five years, the advisory sentence for the next highest class of offense, murder. This may be accomplished by reversing Coleman’s forty-five-year conspiracy sentence and directing that it be reduced to forty years, to run consecutively to the fifteen-year SVF sentence for a total of fifty-five years.
ROBB, C.J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.