KIRSCH, J.
Delinquency adjudications for status offenses are governed by Indiana Code section 31-37-2-1, which states:
A child is a delinquent if, before becoming eighteen years of age, the child:
(1) commits a delinquent act described in this chapter; and
(2) needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving;
(B) the child is unlikely to accept voluntarily; and
(C) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive
intervention of the court.
Thus, we implement a two-prong test: a juvenile may be adjudicated delinquent for a status offense only if the child committed a proscribed delinquent act and the court finds that the child is in need of care, treatment, or rehabilitation. R.B., 839 N.E.2d at 1284.
Here, C.S. was adjudicated a delinquent by the juvenile court for committing the status offense of violating Indiana Code chapter 20-33-2 concerning compulsory school attendance. Indiana Code section 20-33-2-4 provides that “a student shall attend either: (1) a public school that the student is entitled to attend under IC 20-26-11; or (2) another school taught in the English language.” Additionally, Indiana Code section 20-33-2-5, in pertinent part, states, “A student for whom education is compulsory under this chapter shall attend school each year for the number of days public schools are in session.”
C.S. contends that the State failed to prove he was in need of care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he is not receiving, that he is unwilling to accept voluntarily, and that is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the intervention of the court. I.C. § 31-37-2-1.
The only evidence presented by the State relating to C.S.’s need of care, treatment, or rehabilitation in connection with a violation of compulsory attendance law was his attendance record itself showing that C.S. was absent on one full school day and missed at least part of five additional class periods. While the State offered evidence of C.S.’s school performance, it related such performance to C.S.’s attitude, not to his attendance, and the trial court sustained C.S.’s objection to evidence of his attitude, noting that the issue before the court was “whether or not [C.S.] went to school,” not the effort or lack of effort that he expended on his school work. Tr., p.17.
The State asserts that C.S.’s violation of the compulsory attendance law “implicitly show[s] that he was in need of care, treatment, and rehabilitation.” Appellee’s Br. at 3. In R.B., we held that when an excessive amount of absences has been proven, the need of care, treatment, or rehabilitation may be inferred and that the need to be in school on a regular basis was the very care, treatment, or rehabilitation contemplated. 839 N.E.2d at 1285. See also G.N.833 N.E.2d at 1071.
The present case can be readily distinguished. In R.B., the juvenile had twenty-three full-day, unexcused absences and in G.N., fifteen full-day, unexcused absences. In the present case, C.S. had one unexcused full-day absence. In absence of any other evidence that C.S. was in need of care, treatment or rehabilitation regarding school attendance, we cannot infer such need from a single unexcused absence.
The evidence in the record before us shows that, during the fall of 2010, C.S. without excuse was absent for one full school day, missed at least part of five additional class periods, and was tardy twelve times. C.S.’s mother was cooperative with the school when told about his attendance issues and took disciplinary actions at home. Thereafter, C.S. was no longer absent or tardy. Without more, we find that there is insufficient evidence that C.S. is in need of care, treatment, or rehabilitation, a required element in order to be adjudicated as a delinquent in violation of the attendance law. Therefore, we conclude that insufficient evidence was presented to support C.S.’s adjudication as a delinquent child.
BAKER, J., and BROWN, J., concur.