BRADFORD, J.
Flores’s first claim on appeal is that the jury’s award of zero damages is inconsistent with the evidence and inadequate as a matter of law. A jury determination of damages is entitled to great deference when challenged on appeal. Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 462 (Ind. 2001). The applicable standard of review has been summarized as follows:
Damages are particularly a jury determination. Appellate courts will not substitute their idea of a proper damage award for that of the jury. Instead, the court will look only to the evidence and inferences therefrom which support the jury‟s verdict. We will not deem a verdict to be the result of improper considerations unless it cannot be explained on any other reasonable ground. Thus, if there is any evidence in the record which supports the amount of the award, even if it is variable or conflicting, the award will not be disturbed.
Id. (quoting Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (internal citations omitted)). In addition, the Supreme Court has noted the following:
Our inability to actually look into the minds of the jurors is, to a large extent, the reason behind the rule that we will not reverse if the award falls within the bounds of the evidence. We cannot invade the province of the jury to decide the facts and cannot reverse unless the verdict is clearly erroneous.
Id. (quoting Annee v. State, 256 Ind. 686, 690, 271 N.E.2d 711, 713 (1971)).
Flores’s claim is premised upon his assumption that the jury was required to believe Flores’s and Dr. Jones’s testimony that Flores’s injuries were caused by the 2007 collision with Guitierrez. [Footnote omitted.] But the jury was within its fact-finding discretion to discredit this testimony. Evidence at trial indicated that the accident was not particularly violent. Flores drove himself home afterward, and the damage to his vehicle, if any occurred, was slight. Evidence further indicated that Flores was not always forthcoming regarding his history of neck and back pain and that he had had failed to disclose the fact of his January 2010 fall to Dr. Jones. Accordingly, the jury would have been fully justified in finding Flores’s testimony lacking in credibility. Further still, Dr. Jones’ opinion that Flores’s muscle spasm was caused by the accident was directly contradicted by the December 14, 2007 MRI report attributing muscle spasm to osteoarthritis and/or multilevel disc disease. In addition, Dr. Jones specifically testified that the fact of a fall would be relevant to his diagnosis, that he had been unaware of Flores’s January 2010 fall when reaching his diagnosis, and that his assessment of Flores was based, at least in part, upon Flores’s representations. The jury was therefore similarly justified in discrediting Dr. Jones’s diagnosis.
Flores suggests that, without expert testimony to the contrary, the jury was not free to discredit Dr. Jones’s testimony. It is true that “[t]he testimony of a trained physician who has examined and treated a patient concerning matters purely within the medical realm cannot be controverted by lay opinion or by judicial speculation or inference.” Beaman v. Hedrick, 146 Ind. App. 404, 407, 255 N.E.2d 828, 830 (1970) (reversing trial court determination of paternity when expert medical witness‟s testimony was that paternity was improbable but not impossible). “However, on medical matters which are within the common experience, observation, or knowledge of laymen, no expert testimony is required to permit a conclusion on causation.” Willis v. Westerfield, 839 N.E.2d 1179, 1188 (Ind. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).
We are not persuaded that causation in this case was a matter purely within the medical realm. Flores had multiple back problems, including a history of back and neck pain, much of it pre-existing what was from all appearances a relatively minor accident. An MRI report specifically attributed his muscle spasm condition to these pre-existing conditions, not to the accident as Dr. Jones did. Flores did not seek medical attention for his injury from his diagnosing physician during an almost two-year gap between his initial visits and the instant diagnosis. In addition, he sustained a fall during this time period which he did not divulge to Dr. Jones and which Dr. Jones did not consider when reaching his diagnosis. As Dr. Jones testified, such a fall would have been relevant to the diagnosis. The simple facts that Flores had multiple pre-existing back problems with multiple causes and that Dr. Jones’s diagnosis was attributable to an incomplete record and a patient with credibility problems places it outside the “purely medical realm” requiring expert testimony to controvert it. See Ferdinand Furniture Co. v. Anderson, 399 N.E.2d 799, 807-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming verdict contrary to expert witness engineer’s testimony because vigorous cross-examination undermined his conclusions). The jury’s determination that Flores was entitled to zero damages arising out of his accident with Gutierrez is not outside the bounds of the evidence.
BAKER, J., and MAY, J., concur.