Barnes, J.
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I. Self-Proving Clause
We first address the Granddaughters’ contention that it is “undisputed” that Gibbs Sr. did not properly publish his will at the time he signed it. Appellant’s Br. p. 15. Publication of a will is the testator’s act of making it known in the presence of witnesses that the instrument to be signed is the testator’s last will and testament. Callaway v. Callaway, 932 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The purpose of publication is to ensure that the witnesses are aware that the testator knows he or she is about to execute a will, in order to lessen the likelihood of fraud. Id. at 220-21. Sufficient publication may occur if a testator signs a will after another person has referred to it as the testator’s will in the testator’s presence. Arnold v. Parry, 173 Ind. App. 300, 310, 363 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (1977). The publication requirement is embodied in the following section of the Probate Code:
The testator, in the presence of two (2) or more attesting witnesses, shall signify to the witnesses that the instrument is the testator’s will and either:
(A) sign the will;
(B) acknowledge the testator’s signature already made; or
(C) at the testator’s direction and in the testator’s presence have someone else sign the testator’s name.
Ind. Code § 29-1-5-3(b)(1).
The Granddaughters’ assertion that it is “undisputed” Gibbs Sr. did not properly publish his will comes from the deposition testimony of Montgomery and Hubbard. In their despositions, Montgomery and Hubbard indicated that they both believed Gibbs Sr. knew he was signing his will. However, when pressed for details, neither witness to the will could recall Gibbs Sr. ever expressly stating that it was his will; neither is there evidence that anyone else referred to the document as Gibbs Sr.’s Will in his presence before he signed it.
The Granddaughters’ argument that there is “undisputed” evidence of a failure to publish overlooks the self-proving clause, attached to the end of the will, that Gibbs Sr., Montgomery, and Hubbard signed. That clause states:
The foregoing instrument, consisting of this and two preceding typewritten pages, was signed, published, and declared by Wilgus Gibbs, the Testator, to be his Last Will and Testament. In our presence, he signed each of the pages for better identification. We then at his request and in his presence, and in the presence of each other, signed our names as witnesses to the same.
UNDER PENATLTIES FOR PERJURY, we, the undersigned Testator and the undersigned witnesses declare:
(1) That the Testator executed the instrument as his Will;
(2) That, in the presence of both witnesses, the Testator signed and acknowledged his signature;
(3) That the Testator executed the Will as his free and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it;
(4) That each of the witnesses, in the presence of the Testator and of each other, signed the Will as witnesses;
(5) That the Testator was of sound mind; and
(6) That to the best of their knowledge the Testator was at the time eighteen (18) years or more of age.
Appellee’s App. p. 12. Points one through six of this clause track the statutory language governing self-proving will clauses found in Indiana Code Section 29-1-5-3.1(c). [Footnote omitted.]
Subsection (1) of both the clause and the statute clearly allow the fact of publication of a will to be self-proven. In addition, the opening paragraph of the specific self-proving clause in this case expressly states that Gibbs Sr. had in fact published his will. The self-proving clause is itself evidence that Gibbs Sr. published his will.
The question is what evidentiary effect the self-proving clause has, in the context of a summary judgment motion, with respect to Montgomery and Hubbard’s later inability to recall a specific instance in which Gibbs Sr. actually “published” his will. There are cases in Indiana holding that, where there are inconsistencies between a self-proving or attestation clause to a will and subsequent testimony of the witnesses who signed such a clause, it is for a fact-finder to resolve such discrepancies. See Callaway, 932 N.E.2d at 222; Fitch v. Maesch, 690 N.E.2d 350, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied; Munster v. Marcrum, 182 Ind. App. 20, 23, 393 N.E.2d 256, 258 (1979). In Fitch, in particular, a subscribing witness “lack[ed] memory as to aspects of the execution of the contested will . . . .” Fitch, 690 N.E.2d at 353. However, none of these cases were resolved on summary judgment and instead were cases where the fact-finder credited the truth of attestation and/or self-proving clauses as opposed to contrary or vague testimony by the witnesses. Thus, they are of limited relevance in addressing the question before us; namely, the question was not presented in those cases as to whether they could have been resolved by summary judgment.
Indiana Code Section 29-1-7-13(c) states:
If the will is self-proved, compliance with signature requirements for execution and other requirements of execution are presumed subject to rebuttal without the testimony of any witness upon filing the will and the acknowledgment and verifications annexed or attached to the will, unless there is proof of fraud or forgery affecting the acknowledgment or verification.
Thus, a self-proving clause creates a rebuttable presumption that the will was properly executed; publication of a will is one of the aspects of its execution. See Henry’s Indiana Probate Law & Practice § 29.03 (2010) (noting that proper execution of a will requires a writing, a signature, acknowledgment, publication, presence, and attestation by capable witnesses). With respect to rebuttable presumptions generally, “Unless the opponent of the presumption presents evidence tending to disprove the presumed fact, the party in whose favor the presumption operates is entitled to judgment on that issue.” Schultz v. Ford Motor Co., 857 N.E.2d 977, 985 (Ind. 2006).
Here, Hubbard testified during his deposition as follows:
Q: Okay. Did [Gibbs Sr.] indicate to you that this was his will?
A: Yes.
Q: And how did he do that?
A: And I’m just trying to think through the events that day. I guess I can’t really—I don’t know—I mean I know he was looking at the document as— <
Q: And my question is not whether or not you knew what the document was. My question was did he indicate to you what this—that he knew what this document was?
A: I honestly can’t recall.
Appellee’s App. p. 47.
Similarly, Montgomery testified during her deposition as follows:
Q: …. So did Mr. Gibbs Sr. actually signify to you that he knew that this was his last will and testament?
A: I’m trying to think if he actually specifically said, “This is my will that I’m signing,” but I don’t think he said it like that. I mean he knew it was his will.
Q: So he didn’t then?
A: Did not specifically say, “This is my will.”
Q: Did he indicate in any other way?
A: I don’t know.
Id. at 91. Thus, both witnesses expressed their clear belief that Gibbs Sr. knew he was signing his will, which is the foundation of the publication requirement, but could not provide particulars as to what led them to that belief.
We conclude that this uncertainty or lack of memory as to the particulars of the will execution ceremony is insufficient as a matter of law to overcome the presumption, provided by the self-proving clause, that the will was properly executed. We first note that both of the statutes governing will executions generally and self-proving clauses in particular state that they “shall be construed in favor of effectuating the testator’s intent to make a valid will.” I.C. §§ 29-1-5-3(e), 29-1-5-3.1(e). This language, added by the legislature in 2003, is a strong indicator of legislative intent that a validly-signed will, accompanied by a validly-signed self-proving clause, should not be lightly set aside. [Footnote omitted.] As our supreme court has implied, this new language is indicative of “a consistent legislative intent to simplify this process and eliminate unnecessary procedures.” Estate of Dellinger v. 1st Source Bank, 793 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (Ind. 2003).
The Appellate Court of Illinois addressed a scenario similar to the present one in In re Russell’s Estate, 264 N.E.2d 269 (Ill. Ct. App. 1970). There, two of three witnesses to a will gave testimony several years after the will had been executed indicating that they could not remember the particulars of the will’s execution, including whether the testator had been of sound mind when the will was executed as the witnesses had indicated in the attestation clause. [Footnote omitted.] Upon hearing this testimony, the trial court denied probate of the will.
The Appellate Court reversed and held that the will must be probated, despite the witnesses‟ testimony. It noted that the most that could be inferred from that testimony was that the witnesses had no independent memory of whether the testator was of sound mind when the will was attested to. Id. at 272. The court held that this was insufficient to rebut the presumption of due execution of the will, as reflected by the attestation clause. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court quoted the following from the Illinois Supreme Court:
The probate of a will cannot be made to depend upon the recollection or veracity of subscribing witnesses, for if it were necessary for them to remember and testify to the fact that all the prescribed formalities were in fact complied with very few wills could be upheld. The law wisely requires such instruments to be executed and attested with precautions which will usually guard against fraud, and if the attestation clause shows on its face that all the forms required by law have been met, and the signatures on the instrument are admittedly genuine, the presumption of due execution must prevail unless clear and affirmative proof shows the contrary. If it is merely doubtful from the evidence whether the requirements have been complied with, the presumption arising from the attestation clause is not overcome.
Id. at 271-72 (quoting Conway v. Conway, 153 N.E.2d 11, 14 (Ill. 1958)).
We conclude that the holdings of Russell and Conway are sound, and properly reflect the weight that our legislature intended self-proving clauses to have when determining the validity of a will. The failure of witnesses to a will to remember everything that was said when the will was executed is insufficient as a matter of law to overcome the presumption of regularity reflected by a self-proving clause, where there is no doubt as to the genuineness of the signatures on it. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of having self-proving clauses and the presumption that they establish the validity of a will’s execution and, as feared by the Conway court, could open up a large number of wills to challenges based on the faulty memory of witnesses. If there is in fact positive evidence that a testator did not know he or she was signing a will, as opposed to witnesses merely being unable to remember whether the testator expressly said he or she was signing a will, that fact may be sufficient to defeat the presumption of regularity provided by a self-proving clause. See Matter of Jacobson’s Estate, 393 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (distinguishing Russell where two witnesses expressly stated that they did not believe testator was of sound mind when will was signed, instead of merely stating that they could not recollect the details of the will’s execution).
The bottom line here is that when Gibbs Sr. signed the will, neither Montgomery nor Hubbard seemed to have any hesitation that Gibbs Sr. knew precisely what he was signing and what he was doing. Several months after the fact they were unable to recall precise details as to what led them to that conclusion. In our view, that is insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity in the execution of the will that arose as a result of the signing of the self-proving clause. [Footnote omitted.]
If either Hubbard or Montgomery had later expressed doubt that Gibbs Sr. knew he was signing his will, or there was other evidence that he did not know what he was signing, the result in this case might be different. The designated evidence fails to reveal any such doubts or any such evidence. The Granddaughters have failed to rebut the presumption of regularity in the execution of Gibbs Sr.’s Will that is established by the self-proving clause. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in Gibbs Jr.’s favor on this issue.
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RILEY, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.