CRONE, J.
We conclude that there is no evidence that Berry was intoxicated when he committed the offense. We adhere to the longstanding principle that a defendant suffering from a mental disease or defect caused by severe, prolonged, and chronic alcohol abuse that renders that person unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct is not responsible for prohibited conduct committed while in that condition. We conclude that the evidence is undisputed that at the time of the offense Berry suffered from psychotic symptoms caused by his prolonged and severe alcohol abuse and that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in rejecting his insanity defense. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to find Berry not guilty by reason of insanity and for further proceedings as required by the Indiana Code.
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We first address whether the evidence that Berry suffered a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that Berry was insane when the crime was committed. Here, the trial court found, and the experts agreed, that Berry displayed psychotic symptoms on the morning of February 9. Psychosis is defined as “fundamental derangement of the mind (as in schizophrenia) characterized by defective or lost contact with reality especially as evidenced by delusion, hallucination, and disorganized speech and behavior.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ psychosis (last visited July 6, 2011). The Indiana Code defines mental disease or defect as “a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person’s perception.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(b). We conclude that psychosis fits the statutory definition of mental disease or defect. Accordingly, the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that Berry was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense.
However, the experts did not agree on the cause of Berry’s psychotic symptoms. In their reports and at trial, Drs. Olive and Parker attributed Berry’s psychotic symptoms to his Bipolar Disorder. In his report, Dr. Masbaum concluded that Berry’s psychotic symptoms were the result of alcohol intoxication and/or withdrawal and a mental disorder. At trial, Dr. Masbaum testified that Berry’s psychotic symptoms could be explained solely by his voluntary alcohol use. [Footnote omitted.]
The trial court concluded that, based on Berry’s longstanding alcohol abuse and his heavy drinking the weekend before, his psychotic symptoms on the morning of February 9, 2009, were caused by voluntary abuse of alcohol. We observe that Section 35-41-3-6 requires only that a defendant suffer a mental disease or defect; it does not set forth any constraints regarding the source or cause of such disease or defect. However, the trial court found Berry guilty based, in part, on its conclusion that Berry’s behavior was caused by voluntary abuse of alcohol. To hold Berry responsible for his crime, the trial court relied on Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-5, which states, “Intoxication is not a defense in a prosecution for an offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of the offense unless the defendant meets the requirements of I.C. 35-41-3-5.” [Footnote omitted.] In other words, the legislature has decreed that intoxication will not excuse a person from responsibility for his or her conduct. [Footnote omitted.]
Berry argues that there was no evidence that he was intoxicated, and therefore the trial court’s conclusion that his psychotic symptoms were brought on by the voluntary use of alcohol is based on speculation, not evidence. Alternatively, Berry argues that even if “long-term alcohol dependence explains his conduct, it is contrary to law to conclude that the resulting psychotic state and inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was voluntarily induced.” Appellant’s Br. at 18. We address each argument in turn.
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Implicitly, the State concedes that there was no evidence of intoxication in that it does not contest this assertion. Instead, the State invites us to draw an inference of intoxication based on evidence of prior incidents in which Berry acted violently when he was intoxicated. The record shows that Berry has acted violently in the past when he was visibly intoxicated. However, there is no evidence that Berry displayed psychotic symptoms during any of those instances, as he did when he committed the current offense. Given that the prior instances of violence involved outward signs of intoxication but no signs of psychosis, the prior incidents do not support a reasonable inference that Berry was intoxicated on the morning of February 9. Accordingly, our review of the record before us reveals no evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that Berry was intoxicated at the time of the crime. It follows that Section 35-41-2-5 is inapplicable.
We must now answer the second question posed by Berry: whether, as a matter of law, Berry’s psychotic state, having been caused by prolonged and chronic alcohol abuse, was voluntarily induced such that the insanity defense is inapplicable. Although the State does not address this contention, longstanding Indiana case law supports Berry’s argument that his psychotic state was not voluntarily induced.
As early as 1878, Indiana has adhered to the principle that a defendant who manifests a mental disease or defect, as opposed to intoxication, caused by prolonged and chronic alcohol abuse that renders him or her unable to distinguish right from wrong is not responsible for a crime committed while in that condition. That principle is now commonly referred to as “fixed” or “settled” insanity. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 147 (2006) (explaining that the fixed or settled insanity defense exists “where the initial choice to abuse alcohol or drugs has become so attenuated over time that it serves little to no purpose to hold the defendant accountable for that choice once a permanent mental illness has taken hold through years of chronic substance abuse.”). The Indiana Supreme Court explained this doctrine as follows:
As a general proposition of law, mental incapacity, produced by voluntary intoxication, existing only temporarily, but at the time of the commission of the offence [sic] …, is no excuse for the crime, nor a defence [sic] to a prosecution therefor. But where the habit of intoxication, though voluntary, has been long continued, and has produced disease, which has perverted or destroyed the mental faculties of the accused, so that he was incapable, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, on account of the disease, of acting from motive, or distinguishing right from wrong when sober-in short, insane-he will not be held accountable for the act charged as a crime, committed while in such condition.
Fisher v. State, 64 Ind. 435, 440 (1878) (citations omitted).
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We believe that the circumstances of Berry’s case fall squarely within the doctrine of settled insanity. As previously discussed, there is no evidence that Berry was intoxicated at the time of the offense. Further, the evidence that Berry experienced psychotic symptoms at the time of the offense is without conflict, as is the evidence that Berry’s alcohol abuse was prolonged, habitual, and severe. Berry’s mental disease was not temporary as evidenced by the fact that prison doctors have continued to prescribe psychiatric medicines such as lithium and Seroquel. As the doctrine of settled insanity is well established, having been set forth by our supreme court more than 125 years ago, our duty is to apply it where appropriate.
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Here, the conduct described by the trial court supports a reasonable inference that Berry knew what he was doing when he struck Tony with the hammer, but acting knowingly and intentionally is not synonymous with appreciating the wrongfulness of one’s conduct. We observe that Berry and Tony did not know each other, and there is no explanation as to Berry’s motive. On the other hand, Berry had a long history of hospitalization for bipolar disorder. Berry had begun the day reading the Bible, and he told the police that God told him to kill Tony. The police testified that Berry’s answers to their questions were “nonsensical.” Tr. at 232. Father testified that just after the attack, Berry was in a daze, pacing about. Berry wiped the hammer with a towel, but if he was trying to hide the blood, then why did he wrap the towel around the hammer rather than hide or discard it? The trial court emphasizes that Berry did not go immediately to the garage but first put the hammer in Father’s truck. Given that Father told Berry to put the hammer away, the fact that Berry put the hammer in a drawer in the truck does not support a reasonable inference that Berry was trying to hide the hammer. Id. at 165, 238-39. Although Berry did not go immediately to the garage, after he put the hammer away as directed, he came back into the house to ask Father where the garage was, and once he received the information, he obeyed. In addition, Berry did not hide the location of the hammer from the police but told them exactly where it was.
Considered as a whole, the demeanor evidence does not support a reasonable inference of sanity sufficient to create a conflict with the nonconflicting expert testimony that Berry did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. [Footnote omitted.] We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Berry’s conduct and statements before, during, and after the attack point to his knowledge of the wrongful nature of his actions. The evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that Berry was suffering from a mental disease or defect that rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time he attempted to kill Tony.
ROBB, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.